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Abstract 
The Global Financial and Economic Crisis involve complex interaction among diverse causal 
factors. This article seeks to ascertain the policy implications of countries’ exposure and 
responses to these twin crises. It does so by comparing five economies – The United States, 
United Kingdom, Iceland, Greece, and Canada - according to their economic performance 
through the crises. This comparison aims to discern why Canada’s performance surpassed 
that of the other four cases. The paper compares countries’ financial regulations and initial 
exposure to the financial crisis, as well as monetary and fiscal policy responses to mitigate 
the crisis and recession. It finds that monetary and fiscal stimulus were useful in mitigating 
economic contraction, in line with Keynesian economic theory. However, initial financial 
sector soundness, based on effective regulatory and corporate governance, was the key 
determinant of exposure to – and ultimate economic impact of - the financial crisis. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1  Research Question and Hypothesis 
An accurate understanding of the global financial crisis and recession of 2007-2009, 
which has resulted in ongoing economic and political crises in North America and 
Europe, must necessarily consider the diverse experiences of different economies.
1
 
Canada initially suffered alongside other developed economies, but experienced a less 
severe recession as well as a relatively rapid recovery. By 2010 Canadian commodity 
prices had recovered about half of the losses experienced through 2008-2009, and 
average prices on the Toronto stock exchange had nearly returned to their 2007 peak.
2
 
After contracting 2.6% in 2009, Canadian real GDP grew 3.3% in 2010, followed by an 
increase of 2.2% in 2011.
3
  By the end of 2011, unemployment in Canada had returned to 
below where it was in January 2009.
4
 While Canada’s initial unemployment rate was 
higher than in other countries at the onset of recession, it has experienced a more rapid 
correction than elsewhere. While Canadian and American unemployment rates stood at 
6.1% and 5.8% respectively in 2008, the Canadian unemployment rate peaked at 8.3% in 
2009 compared to 9.6% in the US. In terms of recovery, Canada’s unemployment rate 
had dropped to 7.5% by 2011, while unemployment in the US stood steady at 9%.
5
  
Relatively little has been written specifically regarding Canada’s relative performance 
through the financial crisis and recession.
6
 This research paper aims to address this gap in 
                                                 
1
 For an exhaustive survey of the academic literature on the financial crisis in general, consult Robert W. 
Kolb, ed. “Lessons from the Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Our Economic Future.” Hoboken, 
NJ: John Wiley & sons, 2010. 
2
 Statistics Canada, “Chapter 9: Economic Accounts,” Canada Yearbook 2010 (2010): 118. Accessed April 
25, 2012. http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-402-x/2011000/pdf/economic-economique-eng.pdf. 
3
 Statistics Canada, “Chapter 9: Economic Accounts,” 118; Statistics Canada, “Economic Indicators, by 
Province and Territory,” last modified April 25, 2012, accessed April 25, 2012. 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/indi02a-eng.htm. 
4
 Statistics Canada, “Study: Inside the Labour Market Downturn,” last modified July 5, 2011, accessed 
April 25, 2012. http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/110223/dq110223b-eng.htm. 
5
 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Statistical Extracts,” Accessed April 26, 
2012. http://stats.oecd.org.  
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the academic literature. The question is thus posed: Why did Canada fare better through 
the recent financial crisis and recession than other economies? 
 
Figure 1 GDP Growth Rates by Country 
 
 
Figure 2 Unemployment Rates by Country 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
6
 For consideration of Canada in post-crisis financial globalization see: Patrick Leblond, “Canada, the 
European Union, and Transatlantic Financial Governance,” International Journal vol. 66 no. 2 (2005): 57-
72. For a broader cross-country comparison of countries’ experience of the economic crisis see: Stephen G. 
Cecchetti, Michael King and James Yetman, “Weathering the Financial Crisis: Good Policy or Good 
Luck?” BIS Working Paper Series no. 351 (2011). Accessed March 20, 2012. 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/news/conferences/11fmc_cecchetti.pdf. 
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1.2 Methodology 
This paper will compare the experiences of several economies through the financial crisis 
and recession. These experiences will be evaluated according to macroeconomic 
benchmarks such as GDP growth and unemployment. Each country case study will also 
assess: the country’s financial makeup and regulatory regime, which determined initial 
exposure to transmission of the global financial crisis; the country’s exposure to the 
ensuing global recession through trade networks; the country’s monetary policy response 
through the manipulation of interest rates and quantitative easing; the country’s fiscal 
policy response through fiscal stimulus and bail-outs of systemically important financial 
institutions. Countries’ fiscal positions going into the crisis will also be considered, as 
this affects the range of fiscal and monetary response options available to governments.  
This paper employs a comparative research method in order to assess the variables 
outlined in this section – regulatory causes of the crisis, financial interventions, and 
monetary and fiscal policy responses - as they interacted with different political-
economic systems through the course of the financial crisis and recession. Qualitative and 
quantitative methods are employed: approaches to financial regulation and corporate 
governance constitute examples of the former; economic benchmarks such as 
unemployment and GDP growth are examples of the latter. Needless to say, any 
comparative study of global macroeconomic phenomena is subject to considerable 
extraneous variance.
7
 This research design has been selected due to the historical nature 
of the topic. It is not possible to induce and evaluate macroeconomic crises in a 
laboratory, nor would it be ethical to do so. This paper thus undertakes Hopkin’s primary 
use of comparison in political science, that “of developing, testing, and refining theories 
about causal relationships…”
8
 By comparing Canada to several other economies which 
varyingly conform to our selected policy variables, it should be possible to assess the 
influence of these variables on Canada’s performance through the crisis. The correlation 
                                                 
7
 Jonathan Hopkin, “The Comparative Method,” in Theory and Methods in Political Science, third ed. by 
David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 292. 
8
 Hopkin, “The Comparative Method,” 285. 
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of performance outcomes to variables will allow an evaluation of the primary hypothesis 
of this paper.  
The preliminary hypothesis is that, while still affected by a recession due to transmission 
through trade channels
9
, Canada did not suffer from the primary blow of a financial crisis 
as did the United States and Europe. This was due largely to the more robust and 
comprehensive standards of financial governance present in Canada, as well as a strong 
fiscal position going into the crisis. Moreover, the implicit guarantee provided by the 
Canadian government to financial institutions helped maintain investor confidence in 
Canadian banks, mitigating the uncertainty-fueled instability which so weakened 
financial firms and national bond markets elsewhere.  
While Canada’s regulatory framework has to do with history and culture
10
, the role of 
government intervention in moderating economic uncertainty is a staple of Keynesian 
theory and will be given prescriptive consideration in the comparison with other 
economies. It is important to note that the financial crisis and recession were separate, 
though highly interconnected, events. Policy responses to the financial crisis included the 
temporary offering of discount loans to, and in some cases recapitalization of, national 
financial institutions. The economic crisis - the recession - was addressed through fiscal 
and (unprecedented) monetary expansion.
11
 
The case studies selected and their reasons for inclusion are: Canada, as the economy 
under primary consideration; the United States, as the world’s largest economy and the 
epicentre  of the financial crisis; Greece, as an extreme example of the effect of eurozone 
membership and subsequent lack of monetary policy autonomy in addressing the crisis; 
Iceland, as an example of a non-eurozone country with extremely high exposure to the 
financial crisis and limited response capacity due to its small size; the United Kingdom, 
                                                 
9
 Rudolfs Bems, Robert C. Johnson, and Kei-Mu Yi, “Demand Spillovers and the Collapse of Trade in the 
Global Recession,” IMF Economic Review vol. 58 no. 2 (2010): 321. 
10
 Donald Brean, Lawrence Kryzanowski, and Gordon Roberts, “Canada and the United States: Different 
roots, different routes to financial sector regulation,” Business History vol. 53 no. 2 (2011): 260. 
11
 John E. Marthinsen, “Four Paradoxes of the 2008-2009 Economic and Financial Crisis,” in Lessons from 
the Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Our Economic Future, ed. Robert W. Kolb (Hoboken NJ: 
John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 60. 
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as an example of a highly-developed non-eurozone country with a greater range of policy 
response options. Comparing these country case studies will demonstrate the relative 
importance of the policies mentioned, highlighting the importance of prudent fiscal 
management and financial regulation in times of economic growth, thus allowing 
governments the capacity to mitigate the effects of unexpected economic shocks. This in 
turn conforms to an essentially Keynesian prescription for macroeconomic policy 
approaches. It should be noted that this comparative study involves two distinct but 
connected dependent variables: the effectiveness of policy responses in stimulating 
economic recovery and the resumption of growth, and the factors which determined 
exposure to the financial crisis. This dual consideration affected case selection. 
Specifically, Greece was selected as a prime exemplar of the former, while being of 
limited analytical value regarding the latter. 
This paper finds that economies which received fiscal stimulus (the US and Canada) 
performed better than those whose governments pursued austerity (the UK and Greece). 
Iceland did not engage in fiscal stimulus due to the contraction of economic activities and 
government revenues, however it did engage in monetary expansion in the aftermath of 
the financial collapse. Greece is the only case study in which monetary expansion was 
not pursued, due to the constraints of its shared currency. The soundness of countries’ 
financial sectors (or public finances in the case of Greece), debt levels, and risk exposure 
were the primary determinants of vulnerability to the financial crisis, which in turn 
influenced the severity of recession. The size of countries’ financial sectors relative to 
their economy also influenced outcomes – Greece was unable to recapitalize its banks 
because their assets exceeded total GDP by a factor of ten. The US, despite facing a 
titanic financial meltdown, was able to engage in extensive monetary and fiscal stimulus 
by drawing on the resources of the world’s largest economy. The unique position of the 
US dollar as the world’s reserve currency also facilitated the American response. Such 
idiosyncratic national conditions should be kept in mind, and do constitute extraneous 
variables. 
Canadian banks followed more conservative business and lending models than their 
foreign counterparts, and had a closer relationship with government in terms of both 
6 
 
regulatory oversight before the crisis and liquidity support through its duration. The cartel 
structure of the Canadian banking industry also helped to reduce the informational 
asymmetries which contributed to excessive risk-taking elsewhere, as banks had access to 
more information about each others’ activities and balance sheets. In every other case 
study, governments lacked either the institutional capacity or political will to rein in the 
reckless growth of banks’ liabilities (or public debt in the Greek case).  
1.3 Theoretical Overview 
The stock market crash of 1929 which led to the Great Depression contributed to a 
widely held view that financial markets are inherently unstable, expressed most famously 
in the theories of John Maynard Keynes and Hyman Minsky.
12
 Keynes and his disciples 
predicted that the concentration of wealth would drain the purchasing power of the 
middle and lower classes, those most likely to consistently support demand for goods and 
services. Such an economy would become “dangerously dependent on the luxury 
spending of the wealthy few and on unsustainably high levels of private investment.”
13
 
Such an economy would be susceptible to a liquidity trap wherein expectations of falling 
demand and profit would prevent new investment, in which case the government would 
be the only viable driver of economic growth. Such fiscal profligacy would require a 
central bank willing to maintain low interest rates, and financial regulation to control 
credit and prevent it from relocating into speculative bubbles.
14
  
Instability arising from the increasing complexity and interconnectedness of financial 
markets prompted a paradigm shift toward much more comprehensive state regulation of 
financial markets in the postwar period. In the 1970’s and 80’s economic malaise and the 
ascension of efficient market theory drove a shift in the opposite direction, away from a 
                                                 
12
 James Crotty, “Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: a Critical Assessment of the ‘New 
Financial Architecture’,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 33 (2009): 563. 
13
 Timothy A Canova, “Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law: from Market 
Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model,” Harvard Law & Policy Review 3 no. 2 (2009): 
371. 
14
 Canova, “Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law,” “Financial Market Failure as a Crisis 
in the Rule of Law,” 372-75. 
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statist Keynesian model and toward “globally-integrated deregulated neoliberal 
capitalism.”
15
 The last three decades have seen increasing global integration of financial 
markets which have been decreasingly regulated at the national level. This has allowed 
innovation in financial transactions, which critics of neoliberal theory argue have 
“stimulated powerful financial booms,” typically ending in crisis and the necessity of 
state intervention.
16
  
Debate over the economic role of the state has two dimensions in this paper: One is the 
immediate policy responses to the crisis, generally varying between fiscal stimulus and 
austerity (even in cases where austerity was chosen, monetary expansion was still 
generally employed); the second arena of contention regards the role of the state in 
economic, and especially financial, governance. The comparison of policy responses in 
this paper thus considers stimulative Keynesian versus austere neoliberal approaches. The 
American and Canadian responses typically favoured fiscal expansion along roughly 
Keynesian lines. The Greek and British cases saw a general adherence to austerity, 
although in the Greek case this is complicated by exogenous influences stemming from 
membership in the European currency. The Icelandic case is a prime example of the 
dynamics which drove the financial meltdown, although Iceland’s policy responses were 
largely outside of real government control due to the scale of the financial collapse.  
The second set of considerations concerns the systemic instability which caused the 
crisis, and has to do with longer-term financial governance. The US, UK, Greek and 
Icelandic cases all demonstrate failures of financial governance to varying degrees, while 
the Canadian case provides a counterpoint of relatively successful and conservative 
financial sector management. This dimension considers more broadly statist versus free-
market approaches to financial governance, but can still be related to the 
Keynesian/neoliberal debate in its emphasis on the role of government intervention in 
mitigating the amplitude of economic fluctuations. Indeed, to focus merely on policy 
response without considering the broader framework of state economic regulation would 
                                                 
15
 Crotty, “Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis,” 564. 
16
 Crotty, “Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis,” 564. 
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be to misinterpret Keynes. To only focus on monetary and fiscal stimulus post-crisis is to 
ignore the broader Keynesian policy goals, such as more equal income distribution. 
Those who would favour stimulus and bailouts in the absence of more comprehensive, 
state-mandated economic and financial governance have in fact been labeled 
“Commercial Keynesians,” “Wall Street Keynesians,” or, more bluntly, “Bastard 
Keynesians.”
17
 
Critics on the left highlight the incentives for financial firm operators and ratings 
agencies to generate as great a volume of highly-rated securitized debt as possible. 
Compensation structures and the transfer of liability in the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model 
are argued to undermine the theory that deregulated markets will distribute risk where it 
is best able to be borne.
18
 The accurate calculation of risk in pricing complex securities – 
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS’s) which pool hundreds of mortgages and 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO’s) which include dozens of MBS’s – has been 
argued to be impossible in practical terms. Regulators meanwhile stood aside and let 
banks and ratings agencies decide what constituted appropriate levels of leverage, risk, 
and capital. This obvious conflict of interest led firms to use risk management models 
which vastly underestimated loss exposure, stimulating risky investments through 
compensation structures which encouraged such practices.
19
 These transgressions by 
actors in a market free of government intervention militate against the laissez-faire 
approach to financial market regulation which is central to neoliberal philosophy. 
The Keynesian prescription for responding to recessions advocates public spending to 
stimulate demand, once the scope of monetary policy has been exhausted as interest rates 
approach zero percent.
20
 Neoliberal proponents advocate instead a reduction of state 
spending and dogged pursuit of a balanced budget, with the aim of increasing business 
confidence and the role of the private sector. The Thatcher and Reagan administrations of 
                                                 
17
 Canova, “Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law,” 389. 
18
 Crotty, “Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis,” 565-66. 
19
 Crotty, “Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis,” 568-72. 
20
 Maurice Mullard, ” “Explanations of the Financial Meltdown and the Present Recession,” The Political 
Quarterly 82 no. 2 (2011): 204. 
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the 1980’s in the United Kingdom and United States, respectively, are often cited as 
prime examples of this policy framework, despite the fact that public spending as a 
proportion of GDP increased in both countries at this time.
21
 One extreme area of debate 
during the crisis was the partial nationalisation of insolvent banks. The IMF estimates the 
total global cost of bank bailouts during the crisis at around $16 trillion.
22
 This 
expenditure of public funds was undertaken to maintain business confidence in the 
survivability of financial institutions. It should be noted, however, that bailouts do not 
conform to the Keynesian prescription of undertaking fiscal stimulus to support aggregate 
economic demand.  
The instability of American financial institutions, transmitted worldwide through 
globalized financial networks, stemmed from an asset bubble of overvalued real estate 
assets and their associated securities and derivatives. This in turn can be traced to the 
shift to an “originate-to-distribute” model of securitization, characterized by moral 
hazard. Moral hazard arises if institutions are not required to maintain the debt they 
originate, and thus do not bear the risk they generate, but instead pass it on to others 
without sufficient transparency of default risk. The unregulated securities market played a 
critical role in generating the crisis, experiencing a run as an unprotected market “much 
as commercial banks and thrift institutions had been exposed to runs prior to the creation 
of deposit insurance.”
23
  
On the other side of the ideological divide, free market proponents can credibly point to 
the role of government in creating conditions which allowed the housing bubble to arise. 
These include the policy of promoting low-income home-ownership dating back to the 
post-war period which was continued under the Clinton and Bush administrations, as well 
as the maintenance of low interest rates after the recession of 2001.
24
 These policies 
encouraged the explosion of credit and debt of the early 2000’s. From this perspective, 
the problem is not that a neoliberal policy platform was followed, but that it was not 
                                                 
21
 Mullard, “Explanations of the Financial Meltdown and the Present Recession,” 204. 
22
 Mullard, “Explanations of the Financial Meltdown and the Present Recession,” 205. 
23
 Mullard, “Explanations of the Financial Meltdown and the Present Recession,” 213. 
24
 Mullard, “Explanations of the Financial Meltdown and the Present Recession,” 209. 
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followed closely enough. Countercyclical policies to prevent economic bubbles are thus 
argued to have a disproportionate effect on market dynamism and overall prosperity. 
Another major area of theoretical debate is whether the crisis was inevitable – that is, 
bubbles just happen – or whether specific policy decisions allowed it to occur.  
Canada’s financial sector, government, and broader economy conformed to 
countercyclical patterns of investment and savings, whereas the other cases in this paper 
were procyclical in these regards, making them more vulnerable to sudden reverses 
starting in 2007. Significantly, Canada’s banking system has united commercial and 
investment banking since before the 1980’s, preceding the American repeal of Glass-
Steagall by several decades. The common criticism that the financial crisis was caused by 
the American move to universal banking is thus not supported by the findings in this 
paper. The Canadian experience demonstrates that banks can be large and universal, but 
that they must be stable and transparent. This suggests not an avoidance of allowing firms 
to become ‘too big to fail’, but a recognition that such firms must be subject to close 
government oversight due to the element of public good in their activities. This again 
supports a statist-interventionist approach to overall economic governance. Adam Smith 
himself advocated constraints to private liberty for individuals whose actions might 
endanger the broader society, especially regarding banks.
25
 It is here argued that the only 
remedy for such a crisis is prevention, in the form of more comprehensive and proactive 
regulatory oversight as well as improved risk transparency in securities markets. Potential 
avenues for improvement in financial governance at the national and international level 
are therefore considered in the conclusion. 
The first case study in this paper examines the history and growth of the subprime 
housing asset bubble leading to the financial crisis. As the economic and political leader 
of the free (market) world, the United States is where the financial crisis, and this 
analysis, begin.   
                                                 
25
 Otmar Issing, “Some Lessons from the Financial Market Crisis,” International Finance 12 no. 3 (2009): 
437. 
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2 UNITED STATES 
As the epicentre of the global financial crisis, the United States is a necessary starting 
point for analysis. As the wave of deregulation culminated in the repeal of the Glass-
Steagall Act in 1999, the US saw the rise of large financial conglomerates with 
investment and commercial banking portfolios. The 2004 decision to allow banks to carry 
assets in structured off-balance sheet entities, reaffirmed in Basel II
26
 the same year, 
created the conditions for the explosion of asset-backed securitization. The increase in 
systemic risk from the widespread trade in asset-backed securities and derivatives, 
financed through short-term borrowing, was not addressed by regulators at the Securities 
and Exchange Commission or the Federal Reserve. This failure in both corporate and 
public governance resulted in the freeze of credit markets when the value of underlying 
assets began to collapse in 2007.  
 
Global financial linkages and the highly leveraged position of financial institutions turned 
this freeze in short-term lending into a threat to the solvency of some of the world’s 
largest financial firms. In the United States, this resulted in a massive bank rescue by the 
federal government, as well as monetary and fiscal expansion to combat the resulting 
drop in economic activity. As the world’s largest economy and leading financial power, 
the experience of the US is vital to an understanding of the dynamics underlying the 
financial and economic crisis. As the source of the crisis and the leader in global financial 
governance, the policy lessons drawn from the US case are crucial to preventing such a 
crisis in the future. Monetary and fiscal stimulus were employed to combat the effects of 
financial and economic crisis, and were generally successful in this despite the limited 
transmission of monetary expansion through the financial sector to the broader economy. 
The lack of effective regulatory oversight and micro-prudential management are seen as 
the primary factors affecting the generation and severity of the financial crisis. 
                                                 
26
 Since the 1980’s the rules governing capital adequacy for financial institutions have been outlined in the 
internationally-recognized Basel Accord. Current standards are outlined under “Basel II”, although the 
amendments proposed in 2010 (“Basel III”) would raise capital requirements. Leblond, “Canada, the 
European Union, and Transatlantic Financial Governance,” 68. 
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2.1 Financial Regulation 
Deficient regulation comprises one prominent perspective regarding the origination of the 
financial crisis in the United States. It has been observed that regulators were 
insufficiently concerned with banks’ off-balance sheet activities and the potential 
bursting of the real estate asset price bubble, and that they failed to perform appropriate 
institutional stress tests.
27
 Kaufman and Malliaris point out that the United States is “the 
only major country that neither publishes a financial stability report” analyzing financial 
system fragility and vulnerability to shocks, “nor participates in the IMF-World Bank 
Financial Sector Assessment Program, which evaluates bank fragility.”
28
 Before the 
crisis, bank regulators and the Federal Reserve possessed the legal authority to require 
higher capital ratios for banks and to monitor the off-balance sheet activities of bank 
holding companies. It has thus also been argued that the financial meltdown was not so 
much a regulatory failure as “a failure of regulators.”
29
  
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 largely freed 
banks from previous ceilings on depositary and mortgage interest rates, and liberalized 
restrictions on new financial innovations. This opened a decade of financial 
liberalization, which saw the dismantling of the intricate credit controls which had 
mitigated systemic risk by preventing a subprime mortgage market for borrowers with 
bad credit from developing.
30
 The counter-Keynesian revolution culminated in the 1999 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, which removed many 
elements of the 1929 Glass-Steagall Act mandating the separation of commercial banking 
and insurance companies from engaging in generally-riskier investment banking.
31
 One 
of the main lobbyists for this legislation was Robert Rubin, former head of Goldman 
Sachs and later Treasury Secretary in the Clinton administration. Rubin pushed for the 
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deregulatory bill even as he was negotiating his transition from the Treasury to a co-chair 
position at Citigroup. Despite this obvious conflict of interest, Rubin was never charged 
for unethical behaviour.
32
 This illustrates the degree to which regulatory capture and the 
“revolving door” between industry and government helped drive financial deregulation. 
In 2004 the American Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) greatly increased the 
amount of leverage investment banks could hold under pressure from then-Goldman 
Sachs chair and current Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson. The SEC raised 
acceptable leverage from twelve times held capital to forty times, while also making 
compliance voluntary.
33
 This decision crucially allowed the use of off-balance sheet 
entities including Structured Investment Vehicles (SIV’s), exempting firms from capital 
requirements for their investments in asset-backed securities and credit derivatives.
34
 
From 1981 to 2007 financial asset values in the US grew from four times total GDP to 
ten times, household debt increased from 48% of GDP to 100%, and private sector debt 
rose from 123% of GDP to 290%. Financial sector debt rose from 22% of GDP in this 
period to 117%. The financial sector accrued 10% of corporate profits in the early 1980’s 
compared to 40% in 2006, growing from a 6% share of total stock market value to 23% 
in the same period.
35
  
Clearly the financial leveraging, or debt-based investment, allowed by deregulation since 
the 1980’s has been vastly profitable for the financial sector, and has allowed growth in 
investment and consumption through the expansion of credit availability. However the 
scale of the current crisis implies that the degree of systemic risk needs to be monitored 
and managed to prevent the value of financial sophistication from being outweighed by 
the socio-economic shocks of rapid deleveraging during crises. According to testimony 
by Ben Bernanke to the Financial Crisis Inquiry commission in 2010, American financial 
regulation is a landscape of “enormous gaps in authority, duplication of responsibility, 
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and unhealthy jurisdictional competition.”
36
 Finance has been deregulated, but is not 
unregulated, and the structure and execution of regulatory oversight in finance is thus 
crucial in managing systemic risk. 
Financial regulation is a difficult and highly contested arena of US politics. From 1998 to 
2008 the financial industry spent $1.7 billion on campaign contributions and $3.4 billion 
on lobbying federal officials.
37
 The Obama administration has also been criticized for 
delegating management of the crisis to officials who worked extensively on behalf of the 
financial industry in support of deregulation. These include Treasury Secretary Timothy 
Geithner, Chief Economic Advisor Larry Summers, and former Treasury Secretary and 
Goldman Sachs chair Robert Rubin. It has been argued that this represents a commitment 
by this administration to the status quo, and the prioritization of restoring financial sector 
profitability rather than overhauling the regulatory system to reduce systemic risk.
38
 
2.2 The Housing Bubble 
The median American family holds most of its wealth in the form of equity in its home, 
and it is thus unsurprising that all levels of government adopt policies aimed at increasing 
home values.
39
 Median home values rose from $30,600 in 1940 to $119,600 by the year 
2000 (both in 2000 dollars). Of the net wealth of America’s bottom 95% wealthiest 
households, two thirds lies in home equity.
40
 Home values thus significantly affect 
personal wealth, influencing choices of consumption and investment which powerfully 
shape the economy. Through 2008 home prices fell 17%, while stock market values fell 
37%.
41
 This massive reduction in personal wealth led to decreased spending, especially 
on goods, which reduced demand for these goods and related services, resulting in a 
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recession. With reduced aggregate demand, unemployment rose 53% from 4.7% to 7.2% 
of the workforce, the highest rate since 1993.
42
 Unemployment reached 9.3% in 2009, 
and in 2010 the American unemployment rate peaked at 9.6% before dropping down to 
9.1% in 2011.
43
 It is clear that the collapse of financial markets in beginning in 2007 had 
enormous and dire consequences for the real economy. 
The global financial crisis, originating in the United States in 2007, represented a drastic 
simultaneous reappraisal of systemic risk among lending institutions, freezing global 
credit markets and affecting global volumes and patterns of trade.
44
 Systemic risk here 
refers to the probability of breakdowns in an entire system (as opposed to individual 
components). This can occur through losses at an individual institution which prevent it from 
fulfilling its contractual obligations, leading to cumulative losses at other institutions within the 
system in a chain reaction of defaults. Systemic risk can also manifest simply through market 
reappraisal of participants’ risk, based on the similarity of their risk exposure profile to an initial 
loss-suffering entity. This second process has much more to do with “uncertainty” than “risk” 
proper, prompting a pattern of market panic and liquidity hoarding until the severely affected 
institutions are separated from the broader marketplace.
45
 Shifts in global financial flows and 
growing financial interconnectedness in the preceding decades of globalization created 
the global market context for the crisis. 
The Asian stock market crash of 1997-98 saw Asian investors direct capital out of the 
region in search of ‘safe’ financial markets and to keep exchange rates low but stable for 
export-dependent Asian economies.
46
 This was particularly true of sovereign investors 
such as the Chinese central bank, which invested heavily in US government bonds, 
“effectively providing a new source of liquidity and low long-term interest...”47 This easy 
credit drove a boom in the American housing market, which was also fuelled by 
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investors’ flight from the telecom sector after the dotcom crash of 2001.48 That recession, 
and the conversion of savings from rapidly growing surplus economies into credit for 
consumers and governments in deficit-running consumption economies, triggered an 
expansionary monetary policy by the Fed until 2004.
49
 From 2004-2007 rising 
commodity prices and inflationary concerns due to growing Asian demand prompted the 
Fed to raise interest rates. Foreign and domestic capital was now redirected towards the 
‘safe’ housing market, both through direct investment and indirectly through investment 
in US government bonds. Low interest rates from 2001-2004, and subsequent 
deregulation allowing off-balance sheet investments, generated the growth of easy credit 
in the US economy which fuelled a housing asset bubble. 
The recent financial crisis can only be understood in the context of increasing financial 
integration and systemic interdependence. In the early twentieth-century American home 
mortgages were held by local banks, and mortgage defaults leading to bank failures 
tended to be regional in nature and tied to overall regional economic performance. In the 
1930’s the Hoover administration created the Federal Home Loan Banks to provide short-
term credit to Savings & Loan companies, laying the groundwork for President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s establishment of the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or 
‘Fannie Mae’). These institutions were intended to provide liquidity to housing markets, 
and the role of FNMA specifically was to both buy and insure mortgages.
50
  
In 1949 the Federal Housing Act created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to 
insure home mortgages and build 810,000 units of public housing. These institutions 
succeeded in promoting home ownership, which grew from 43.6% of households in 1940 
to 61.9% in 1961.
51
 FNMA was privatised in 1968, and in 1970 the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or ‘Freddie Mac’) was established. ‘Freddie’ would not 
only make and insure home loans, but would also securitize loans in an effort to create a 
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market for mortgage securities and thus spread their associated risk.
52
 This would be 
done by pooling the value of mortgages and selling these aggregated values as securities, 
reducing perceived associated risk to attract investors, and thereby increasing the supply 
of mortgages and decreasing their market price.
53
 The lower price would result in 
mortgages being available to more people of lower incomes, who otherwise would not 
qualify, further increasing home ownership in the United States. 
Although they were technically private entities, Fannie and Freddie had the implicit 
backing of the federal government, and were thus able to borrow at a lower rate. Further 
exemptions from many federal and state taxes translated into a roughly $1 billion/year 
subsidy for these ‘quasi-national’ enterprises. Freddie also pioneered the use of off-
balance sheet entities to hide losses and liabilities.
54
 However, since these subsidies and 
liabilities were unofficial they did not appear on the government’s balance sheet and so 
did not provide fees for what was in essence state insurance. These foregone insurance 
fees, which would have been paid were Fannie and Freddie wholly private firms, resulted 
in even higher profits which were passed on to shareholders.
55
 Following the Federal 
Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, Fannie and Freddie 
were to be overseen by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and so the 
assumption by investors of government backing and support is understandable. Under 
this same law, the GSE’s were encouraged by their unofficial government backers to 
make ever-riskier home loans in an effort to further promote affordable housing in low- 
and medium-income areas.
56
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This expansion of increasingly risky mortgage lending continued under Presidents 
Clinton and Bush, essentially allowing housing to be subsidised without congressional 
approval or funding. This was the emergence of the ‘sub-prime’ class of mortgages. Sub-
prime mortgages typically carried high fees and consisted of much less documentation 
than prime mortgages. They typically also required a much smaller down payment as a 
proportion of home value (often less than 10%), and frequently included interest 
payments representing over half of a borrower’s income. Their defining characteristic, 
however, was their extension to “borrowers with poor credit history or no legitimate 
financial capacity to assume mortgage loans.”
57
 Sub-prime mortgages thus represent a 
primary point of leverage, wherein the borrower takes on debt far in excess of their 
assets, which consisted of the small amount of equity in their home.  
These revenue streams from the payments on these new mortgages were pooled into 
securities considered to be ‘low risk’, creating ‘new’ financial assets. Mortgage-backed 
Securities were then marketed to investors in an ‘originate-to-distribute’ model. Banks 
would trade these securities through off-balance sheet investment vehicles, or conduits, 
referred to as “Structured Investment Vehicles.” The default risk of borrowers was thus 
passed on by the originating institution, through these long-maturing SIV’s, to short-term 
investors – many of whom in turn were other financial institutions.
 58
 By June 2008 
Fannie and Freddie’s debts and obligations totalled $6.6 trillion, $1.3 trillion more than 
the entire US public debt.
59
  
The new housing-based credit market added to the credit availability generated by low 
interest rates, allowing easy refinancing leading to an artificially low mortgage default 
rate in the years 2000-2007. The assumption that mortgages could be repaid through 
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refinancing worked, as long as house prices continued their decades-long trend of 
appreciation. This assumed asset appreciation would allow even low income households 
to post their own houses as collateral, which they could always sell in order to repay the 
loan.
60
 The risk of default was thus theoretically very low, even for low income 
households, so long as house prices were increasing. This low default rate, and thus ‘low 
risk’, allowed higher profits through lower lending rates. The cycle of high profit through 
superficially low risk led major investment banks, the main barometers of market risk 
assessment, to uncritically accept the value of mortgages and their derivative securities.
61
  
The loosening of financial regulations from 1994 through 2004 allowed the merging 
(through holding companies) of investment banks, insurance, and securities trading firms 
as well as the reduction of capital reserves.
62
 Capital reserves were also not required for 
“off-balance sheet” entities such as “Structured Investment Vehicles” or SIV’s, 
investments whose liabilities did not appear on corporate balance sheets as long as they 
could find continual sources of financing. These SIV’s included MBS derivatives such as 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO’s).
63
 Lenders could now legally take riskier actions, 
while the organizations responsible for assessing (and therefore pricing) this risk were 
now the same ones who would profit from an artificially low risk assessment. The 
perception of low risk was reinforced by default insurance, the provision of which was 
dominated by American International Group (AIG).
64
 In 2004 home ownership in the 
United States peaked at 69.2%, which proved popular with voters upon whom the 
subtleties of the system were largely lost while its outcome seemed to ‘work’.
65
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2.3 Bubble Burst and Financial Crisis 
In 2003 Fannie and Freddie registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), subjecting them to a mandatory evaluation of accounting practices previously not 
required. The Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSE’s) were found to have routinely 
and intentionally violated industry best practices when assessing risk and making loans. 
This was due to direct encouragement from government which sought to maintain this 
off-budget housing subsidy.
66
 That the liabilities represented by MBS and CDO markets 
were reflected neither on private nor public balance sheets meant that they existed outside 
of the regulated banking sector, and by 2007 the market amassed $5.9 trillion in 
unregulated assets with no lender of last resort.
67
 
Opportunities to refinance mortgages began to grow scarce in the wake of rising interest 
rates from 2004, with US house prices peaking in mid-2006. As financial room to 
manoeuvre shrank, sub-prime mortgages experienced a wave of delinquencies and 
foreclosures.
68
 In 2005 mortgage defaults began to increase, however MBS financial 
products continued to be considered ‘low risk’. Meanwhile, mortgage insurers were 
paying more and more to cover increasing defaults, but had maintained insufficient 
capital stocks.
69
 Because the long-maturing debt-based securities were marketed as short-
term investments which had to be constantly refinanced as investors withdrew their 
money, major banks had to cover the gap in credit as lenders stopped reinvesting.
70
 
Fewer investors reduced demand, lowering prices of debt-based securities. This forced 
firms to sell assets to raise short-term cash, which further flooded the market with 
securitized assets in a downward price “death spiral.”
71
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Leverage is used by firms to increase gains (and losses) on investment by using borrowed 
funds to purchase assets beyond what their total equity would allow. The higher a firm’s 
asset-to-equity ratio is, the greater its leverage and the higher its risk exposure. Firms can 
lower this exposure by selling assets to pay off debt, reducing their asset-to-equity 
ratios.
72
 However, in the event of an economy-wide asset sell-off the value of assets 
themselves falls rapidly with demand. Selling these devalued assets at a loss thus reduces 
equity as well as – and potentially more than - liabilities. This is exactly what occurred 
from December 2007 through March 2009, as the American Dow Jones Industrial 
Average declined over 51%.
73
 This prevented many companies from deleveraging even 
as they attempted to sell off assets and repay debt, as their equity values declined 
sufficiently to maintain or even increase their asset-to-equity ratios. Even as some debt 
was paid off, its weight against remaining equity did not shrink. Risk exposure thus 
remained, keeping investment scarce. 
As losses began to outweigh revenues and reserves a severe liquidity crunch emerged as 
banks became wary of lending to each other. Through mid- to late-2007 American and 
European banks began to warn investors they would receive little if any returns from 
certain funds as their values became impossible to determine and interbank refinancing 
dried up. It was unclear who possessed these bad assets, which had been so widely 
distributed through the financial system.
74
 The portfolios of firms invested in the MBS 
market (as most large investors were) lost value, leading stocks to plummet as investors 
rushed to sell of risky assets. The downward spiral of investment ratings and investor 
confidence began to shake the entire financial system.
75
 The housing price collapse 
spread through financial institutions to the wider housing sector. This collapse in house 
prices, and thus household wealth, combined with the evaporation of credit markets to 
freeze both consumer spending and corporate investment. The financial crisis thus spread 
to the real economy, bringing the flow of capital, goods and services to a standstill. 
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2.4 Policy Response: Financial 
Interventions 
In March 2008 Bear Stearns, America’s second largest mortgage lender, was bought by 
JPMorganChase for 2% of its book value in a deal whereby the Fed essentially covered 
the $30 billion difference by providing loan guarantees.
76
 In July 2008, Congress passed 
the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA), authorizing the Treasury to buy 
unlimited GSE securities to prevent default on GSE obligations, the cost of which was 
estimated at about $25 billion.
77
 By 2009, revelations of the extent of Fannie and 
Freddie’s asset values had increased this cost to over $200 billion, including $40 billion 
in new credit to the firms.
78
 The entire financial sector bailout is estimated to expose the 
US government to an additional $8 trillion in credit risk, as it has in fact entailed greater 
implied guarantees to the financial sector.
79
 Government attempts to ensure solvency of 
large financial firms creates a ‘moral hazard’ of recklessness if banks are seen as ‘too big 
to fail’, encouraging riskier (and therefore potentially more profitable) actions because 
ultimately it is taxpayers who are accountable for managerial decisions.
80
  
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in September, 2008 exceeded the scale of any previous 
bankruptcy in world history by a factor of six, and fueled the growing panic in financial 
markets.
81
 The Fed subsequently acquired 80% of AIG in an $85 billion rescue loan.
82
 In 
late September the US’s largest savings and loan institution, Washington Mutual, was 
sold to J.P. Morgan. By the end of September the fourth largest US bank, Wachovia, was 
acquired by Citigroup.
83
 To avoid insolvency Fannie and Freddie were (re)nationalized at 
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this time, and taxpayers now explicitly guaranteed a large proportion of MBS’s. Treasury 
Secretary Henry Paulson, who had defended the Bear Stearns’ bailout on the grounds of 
financial stability, subsequently pushed for an additional $700 billion in federal funds to 
purchase other MBS’s (‘troubled assets’) in order to prevent a wide scale market crash by 
propping up demand.
84
 When the House of Representatives rejected this Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) at the end of September 2008 world markets began a panicked 
sell-off, “wiping out $1 trillion in market value.”
85
 
While it has commonly been argued that it was the government decision not to prevent 
the Lehman Brothers’ collapse which drove financial markets into a panic
86
, this is not 
necessarily the only explanation. While interbank lending rates did rise somewhat after 
the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, markets largely calmed after the intervention to rescue 
AIG a few days later.
87
 Taylor has argued that it was in fact the testimony presented by 
Fed chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson on September 23, a 
week after Lehman’s collapse, which revealed the severity of the crisis and drove markets 
into a tailspin. 
“They provided a 2-1/2 page draft of legislation with no mention of 
oversight and few restrictions on the use. They were questioned 
intensely in this testimony and the reaction was quite negative, judging 
by the large volume of critical mail received by many members of the 
United States Congress.”
88
 
Following this testimony, interbank lending rates increased drastically and consistently. 
Uncertainty regarding the criteria for government intervention to save financial 
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institutions (saving Bear Stearns and AIG but not Lehman Brothers) was exacerbated 
rather than mitigated by the vagueness of the TARP legislation.
89
 
When Congress finally passed the TARP bill in early October, international financial 
markets had already undergone severe trauma. The threat of a ‘crisis’ and financial 
‘meltdown’ panicked stock markets which continued to plummet in a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.
90
 Under TARP, significant government transfers were made to the banking 
sector and related financial institutions which required a 25% increase in the federal 
budget and a 7% increase in the total national debt.
91
 The Federal Reserve also began 
purchasing MBS’s from Fannie and Freddie in 2008, eventually adding over $1.4 trillion 
to its balance sheet.
92
 Overall, the bailout represented the largest absolute increase in US 
government debt in history, and the largest proportional debt increase since World War 
Two.
93
  
2.5 Policy Response: Monetary 
Expansion 
The American government’s monetary response to the crisis was rapid. When interbank 
lending initially froze in August 2007, the Federal Reserve injected $24 billion of credit 
into the financial sector.
94
 The Fed cut interest rates from 5.25% in September of 2007 to 
2% in April 2008, and finally to .25% by September of 2008.
95
 While this did help ease 
the pressure on financial institutions, it also caused the dollar to depreciate and the price 
of oil to rise drastically. From August, 2007 to July 2008, oil prices rose from $70 per 
                                                 
89
 Taylor, “The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses,” 26. 
90
 Congleton, “On the Political Economy of the Financial Crisis and Bailout of 2008-2009,” 306. 
91
 Congleton, “On the Political Economy of the Financial Crisis and Bailout of 2008-2009,” 307. 
92
 Congleton, “On the Political Economy of the Financial Crisis and Bailout of 2008-2009,” 313. 
93
 Congleton, “On the Political Economy of the Financial Crisis and Bailout of 2008-2009,” 312. 
94
 Goddard et al., “The Crisis in UK Banking,” 279. 
95
 Frederic S. Mishkin, “Is Monetary Policy Effective During Financial Crises?” American Economic 
Review: Papers & Proceedings 99 no. 2 (2009): 573; Taylor, “The Financial Crisis and the Policy 
Responses,” 20-21. 
25 
 
barrel to over $140 per barrel.
96
 This caused two secondary shocks to the economy as 
gasoline prices increased drastically, driving down automobile sales. Oil prices did 
eventually come back down as estimates of global economic growth worsened. However, 
the combined rise in oil and other commodity prices resulting from a depreciating dollar 
served to prolong the crisis, indirectly affecting such economically important sectors as 
the automobile industry.  
While the expansionary monetary policy pursued since the financial crisis has helped 
corporate borrowing recover from its collapse in 2007-2009, non-corporate businesses 
(including most small businesses) actually undertook no net borrowing through Q1 
2011.
97
 As of summer 2011, the majority of loan requests by non-corporate and small 
businesses were being turned down or receiving only partial approval of their requests. 
Borrowing rates for these businesses have also remained relatively high, generally over 
6%, “even while commercial banks have been able to borrow on the federal funds market 
at near-zero rates since the beginning of 2009.”
98
 Pollin demonstrates how these 
borrowing rates for non-corporate and small businesses have changed little from the mid-
2000’s, when the federal funds rate varied from roughly 3% to as high as 5.25%.
99
  
Commercial and non-depository financial institutions have thus essentially absorbed the 
effects of the lowering of interest rates by the Fed, increasing cash reserves from $20.8 
billion in 2007 to $1.4 trillion (10% of GDP) by Q1 2011.
100
 While insufficient reserves 
were a significant part of the weakness of financial firms which led to the crisis, banks 
have now gone in the opposite direction of hording cash while remaining wary of 
lending. The benefit of the Fed’s expansionary monetary policy, the provision of 
affordable credit, has largely accumulated in large financial institutions while remaining 
difficult to access by smaller businesses. Especially concentrated in the construction and 
retail industries, these credit market obstacles combined with declining sales have 
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continued to provide significant challenges to American businesses and economic 
recovery in general.
101
 While monetary expansion has helped improve banks’ balance 
sheets and thus stabilized business confidence, it has not stimulated the resumption of 
economic growth through increased investment as predicted by Keynesian theory. 
However, it was still a powerful tool in mitigating the financial crisis and thus 
forestalling the economic fallout of a total financial collapse. 
2.6 Policy Response: Fiscal Stimulus 
The financial crisis saw household wealth plummet with asset values, and households 
reasonably reacted to this balance sheet shock by increasing savings. Personal 
consumption expenditures in the US account for roughly 70% of GDP, or $10 trillion. 
This means that every 1% increase in savings reduces spending, and thus income, by 
roughly $100 billion. From December, 2007 to May, 2009 the US savings rate rose by 
6.5% from 0.4% to 6.9% - implying a $650 billion reduction in national income.
102
 This 
increase in savings, while making eminent sense at the micro-economic level, generates 
massive macro-economic effects on aggregate demand and national incomes. The 
Economic Stimulus Act passed in February 2008 sought to distribute over $100 billion in 
cash directly to the American people in an attempt to stimulate demand by boosting 
household balance sheets. This represented a fiscal rather than monetary response as the 
funding was provided by borrowing rather than money creation. This temporary rebate 
did not significantly increase spending, however, as consumption and aggregate demand 
remained largely unaffected.
 103
 While the majority of policy response to the crisis 
through 2008 was monetary in nature, or consisted of targeted bailouts to large firms
104
, 
2009 saw a massive government stimulus program unveiled. 
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The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was passed and signed in 
February, 2009. Drafted at the urging of the Obama administration, the ARRA was a 
direct response to the economic crisis with three immediate goals: mitigate job losses and 
stimulate job growth; “Spur economic investment and stimulate long-term growth”; 
foster accountability and transparency in government spending.
105
 The ARRA allocated 
$787 billion (raised to over $840 in the Obama administration’s 2012 budget) of federal 
funds into tax credits, government contracts, loans, and entitlements to households and 
businesses.
106
  
So far, the federal stimulus program has allocated $297.8 billion in tax benefits. This 
includes over $240 billion to individuals and households; $33.5 billion in tax incentives 
for businesses hiring specific demographics such as veterans and 16-24 year-olds; $10.8 
billion for energy efficiency improvements to households and businesses; $9.2 billion for 
industrial and infrastructure development, education and job training in high-
unemployment areas; and $3.7 billion for “assistance with continuing health 
coverage.”
107
 The ARRA allocates a further $231.1 billion in government contracts, 
grants and loans for infrastructural investment in education, transportation, energy 
efficiency, environmental protection and restoration, housing, technological research, and 
health.
108
 Finally, the ARRA allocates $224.3 billion to entitlement programs such as 
Medicaid/Medicare, unemployment insurance, family services, housing, and energy and 
agricultural subsidies.
109
 The ARRA represents fiscal stimulus on a titanic scale.  
The reaction of economists to this legislation varied according to their perspectives on the 
economic role of the state. In January 2009 the CATO institute published an ad in major 
American newspapers wherein approximately 200 economists rejected the need for 
government spending to stimulate growth. The ad explicitly denied that “all economists 
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are now Keynesians” and argued for “reforms that remove impediments to work, savings, 
investment and production. Lower tax rates and a reduction in the burden of 
government...”
110
 Conversely, more statist-minded economists published their own letter 
to Congress (also with roughly 200 signatories) urgently advocating adoption of the 
ARRA to provide “important investments that can start to overcome the nation’s 
damaging loss of jobs... and put the United States back onto a sustainable long-term 
growth path.”
111
 
US federal deficits averaged just 0.8% of GDP under president Clinton and 2% under 
President Bush. By comparison, the deficit reached 10% of GDP ($1.4 trillion) in 2009, 
8.9% in 2010, and was projected at 10.9% of GDP in 2011.
112
 This occurred as a result of 
the recession itself through falling profits, asset prices, and thus government revenues. 
However the sharp deficit increase was also a result of the ARRA. Despite the fears 
voiced by fiscal conservatives, the fiscal expansion starting in 2009 did not significantly 
raise interest rates on government debt or inflation.
113
 The ARRA also did not ‘end’ the 
recession in terms of stimulating growth to bring unemployment back down from its 
average of around 9%. However, recent research suggests that “the downturn would have 
been significantly more severe in the absence of the ARRA.”
114
 Counterfactual forecasts 
by the Congressional Budget Office considered hypothetical developments in the absence 
of the ARRA, which it found to have contributed to GDP and mitigated unemployment 
from 2009-2011. The positive effects of ARRA were simply “too modest relative to the 
impacts of the financial collapse and great recession.”
115
 Both monetary and fiscal 
expansion mitigated the amplitude of the recession, in accordance with Keynesian 
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assumptions. However, the scale of economic crisis due to the titanic collapse in financial 
markets prevented these measure from overcoming such a massive market correction. 
2.7 Analysis 
The period from 1985-2007 saw a convergence in the field of economic theory that 
monetary policy was all that was needed to prevent another Depression. “Governments 
believed that low inflation and interest rates were the ultimate instruments of a free 
market economy to sustain growth without suffering from booms and bursts, let alone a 
crisis.”
116
 Investors overlooked the housing bubble partially because it was obscured by 
low interest rates, but industry leaders like Ben Bernanke and Alan Greenspan also likely 
would not have relished acknowledging its role in their successfully ending the 2001 
recession.
117
 The Federal Reserve typically responds to recessions by lowering interest 
rates to encourage lending and thus spending and consumption. In the downturn of 1990 
interest rates were lowered from 9% to 3%, during the 2001 recession they went from 
6.5% to 1%, and in 2008 interest rates were lowered from 5.25% to almost 0%.
118
  
The efficacy of monetary policy is inherently limited, as interest rates cannot go below 
0%, and the only time they have been so low in the past was during the Great 
Depression.
119
 This underscores Keynes’ insight into the need for government spending 
through fiscal policy when monetary policy options have been exhausted. When the 
private sector refuses to spend, the public sector must step in.
120
 Massive fiscal and 
monetary stimulus were employed by the US government and did dampen the economic 
shock resulting from the financial crisis. However, the crisis itself was of such a scale 
that no response could reasonably have been expected to completely counteract its 
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effects. There was simply no “policy silver bullet that could have been expected to 
contain the crisis.”
121
 Preventing such financial crises is thus the only remedy to the 
economic crises they induce. 
Fannie and Freddie’s status as GSE’s implied a government guarantee of their solvency. 
However, this obligation was not represented in the budget and so its risk went largely 
unmanaged. Federal guarantees do not eliminate risk, they simply shift it from investors 
onto taxpayers, with governments unlikely to attempt to control or price this risk while 
simultaneously denying that a guarantee exists.
122
 The implied federal guarantee of 
Fannie and Freddie served as an indirect subsidy by reducing the burden of risk 
compensation from the GSE’s to investors, who were willing to buy even from near-
insolvent GSE’s because the ultimate issuer of debt-based securities is seen to be the US 
Treasury. In lieu of paying the government for this privilege, Fannie and Freddie were 
tasked with providing credit to “underserved markets”.
123
 These GSE’s produced large 
profits for shareholders because their borrowing and lending privileges allowed higher 
net income than for comparable private financial institutions. When private institutions 
did enter the market for these artificially low-risk securities, they profited from the 
established market ‘wisdom’ of artificially low mortgage default risk. Private entrance 
into mortgage securitization thus expanded the ultimate risk exposure of government. In 
the American case then, the implied guarantee thus became a form of corporate subsidy, 
which did not appear in the budget because it would only be paid in the event of market 
failure.
124
 
The US government enlisted the private financial sector to facilitate government 
financing by securitizing and marketing mortgage risk. Beyond moral hazard is the 
problem of ‘regulatory capture’ of government institutions by organizations they are 
supposed to oversee. The Fed faces a potential conflict of interest as the lender of last 
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resort to banks and emergency provider of liquidity, as it bears the responsibility of 
rescuing banks ‘too big to fail’ which are affected by interest rates which it controls.
125
 
While broader government oversight of financial firms is clearly in order, the role of the 
Fed in monetary policy is important. Widening the range of stakeholders with an interest 
in capturing Fed policy not only creates conflicts of interest but also bears the serious 
ramifications of an increasingly politicized monetary policy.
126
 As the main agent of 
policy response to the crisis until September 2008, the Fed focused on its legal mandate 
as lender of last resort and protector of banks against collapse.  
The American case illustrates the multiple roles of informational asymmetry in 
generating the financial crisis. A decades-long policy of subsidizing low-income housing 
off-balance sheet culminated in a real estate asset bubble, with taxpayers ultimately liable 
when the bubble burst. This hidden subsidy, paid only in the event of market failure, 
fueled the bubble by making the real estate and associated securities markets appear 
artificially profitable through the discount borrowing available to Fannie and Freddie. 
The financial industry’s political influence allowed private firms to enter the subprime 
market on a roughly equal footing to the GSE’s and fuel this bubble by carrying assets 
and liabilities off-balance sheet. This was overlooked by government regulators eager to 
end the recession of 2000-2001, and amplified by the associated long period of low 
interest rates from 2001-2004.  
The unregulated ‘shadow banking’ sector in over-the-counter securities meant that once 
underlying asset values began to fall, the opacity of counterparty risk led all financial 
institutions to restrict lending regardless of the quality of potential borrowers. Finally, the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers and the vagueness of the initial response in the form of 
TARP exacerbated this systemic uncertainty, sending financial markets into a tailspin, 
which spread globally through transnational financial networks. Failures occurred on the 
part of regulators, legislators, corporate leadership, and individual borrowers who could 
not afford their mortgages in the long term. However, it was the lack of systemic 
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informational transparency which encouraged each of these actors to pursue short-term 
advantage while assuming the others were acting in good faith. The American case 
illustrates that monetary and fiscal stimulus are useful policy tools for combating 
recession. The scale and financial nature of the crisis, however, required additional tools 
in the form of financial interventions to subdue market fears of contagion and systemic 
risk. The rapid deregulation, consolidation, and growth of the financial sector was the 
necessary condition for generating the systemic risk which induced the crisis in the first 
place. 
3 ICELAND 
3.1 Introduction 
Iceland represents an extreme example of how deregulation and financial innovation can 
lead to systemic risks “which may seem obvious after they occur but can have 
devastating effects on nations in which policy makers are still in the learning process.”
127
 
During his fourteen-year period in office from 1991-2004, Prime Minister David 
Oddsson’s government pursued a strongly neoliberal program of economic deregulation 
and privatization. Despite generating a large trade deficit and increasing foreign debt, 
these reforms were met with both domestic and international approval as a means of 
stimulating rapid economic growth. In 2007 Iceland’s average annual income was 1.6 
times that in the US at $70,000, studies showed Icelanders to be the happiest people in 
the world, and the Icelandic government tied with New Zealand and Finland as the 
world’s least corrupt public administration.
128
 Icelandic stock market values had 
increased by a factor of nine from 2001 to 2007, and the current account deficit was the 
highest in the world at 24% of GDP. Moreover, Iceland’s three main banks had increased 
their asset values by almost nine times total GDP, far outpacing the Central Bank’s 
ability to act as a lender of last resort.
129
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The IMF, along with foreign and domestic economists, had issued warnings that this was 
an unsustainable model. However Iceland’s finance ministry, Central Bank (CBI), and 
Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) allowed citizens to continue to borrow to excess. 
The government, along with the Chamber of Commerce, touted Iceland as a successful 
exception to the rules of fiscal and monetary prudence.
130
 By the end of 2008 the 
country’s three big banks had collapsed, along with the currency, and been taken over by 
the government. Iceland’s financial meltdown was the most severe and complete of any 
Western country in the global financial crisis.
131
 In January 2009, Iceland’s government 
became the first to resign as a result of the global financial crisis.
132
 
Iceland’s Conservative party largely blamed the crisis on exogenous factors stemming 
from the American financial meltdown and, to a lesser extent, its repercussions in Britain. 
However it has been argued that the extreme form of leveraging by Icelandic bankers, 
and concomitant failure of Iceland’s financial regulators, made a meltdown likely to 
occur in the face of “any of many events.”
133
 Iceland’s three main banks were allowed to 
grow far larger than the capacity of the Central Bank to act as lender of last resort, or for 
Iceland’s tiny economy and tax base to allow their recapitalization in the case of 
emergency. This occurred as the banks were deregulated and their new managers turned 
their traditional role as savings and loan institutions into a capital base for leveraged, 
speculative investment.
134
 Iceland’s case thus also demonstrates the role of lax regulatory 
oversight in allowing the buildup of systemic risk. It also demonstrates the procyclical 
nature of bank failures in driving market panic when the government is unwilling, or in 
the Icelandic case unable, to intervene to stabilize the financial sector. This case also 
shows how monetary and fiscal policy responses are constrained by the size of financial 
crisis in proportion to the economy as a whole. 
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3.2 Financial Regulation 
Upon accession to the European economic area in 1994 and the loosening of restrictions 
on cross-border economic flows, the Oddsson government began a program of state asset 
privatization and labour deregulation.
135
 In fairness to reformers, Iceland had been a 
“terminally sick socialist economy” when Oddsson came to power in 1991.
136
 Ponderous 
and inefficient state institutions, a large budget deficit, and high inflation had hobbled 
Iceland’s economy through the 1980’s. Beginning in 1998, the two large public banks 
were privatized in a process closed to foreign bidders, which saw Landsbanki acquired 
mainly by major figures in the conservative (Independence) party. The second main bank, 
Kaupthing, was allocated to prominent members of Independence’s coalition partner, the 
Centre Party.
137
 Iceland’s third major bank, Glitnir, was later created from the merger of 
several smaller banks and dominated by private business interests with little affiliation 
with the traditional ruling parties. The new owners of these three banks also set up private 
equity companies which purchased further holdings in the banks. Iceland’s financial 
system was now intensely concentrated, directed by a handful of politically connected 
owners with little “experience in national, let alone international, finance.”
138
  
The privatization of Iceland’s banks transformed executive compensation policy into “an 
aggressive investment banking-style incentive system,” which encouraged greater risk-
taking.
139
 Icelandic bank owners and management undertook a deliberate policy of 
borrowing from their own banks to purchase shares in their own, and their competitors’, 
institutions in order to drive up both firms’ share prices without any actual added 
capital.
140
  From 2003 all three major banks began acquiring financial services firms in 
Scandinavia and Northern Europe. Overseas proxy companies were also established in 
places like Luxembourg and the British Virgin Islands to further purchase shares in 
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Icelandic banks. By the end of 2007 Icelandic banking firms owned 56 “overseas 
operating units” in 21 countries.
141
  
Before the 1990’s, Iceland was characterised by extensive state intervention in the 
economy. Commercial banks especially were typically aligned with one of the two main 
political parties: the Conservative (Independence) Party, which generally represented 
urban commercial and fishing interests, and; the smaller Centre Party, representing the 
countryside and cooperatives.
142
 During privatization in the 1990’s and 2000’s the main 
banks were “bought by friends of the main parties, with no experience of modern 
banking. No foreign ownership was sought.”
143
 Iceland’s lax financial regulations helped 
generate both the country’s economic boom and the eventual meltdown. Iceland’s 
regulators in fact had little specialized knowledge of international banking, and over time 
the government came to rely on the banks themselves for economic information.
144
  
Low taxes and weak oversight by the FSA both fueled profits and encouraged their use 
for further speculation. Capital reserve levels required by the Central Bank were lowered 
during the boom of the early 2000’s. After the crisis, it would become known that the 
Central Bank maintained these low requirements in response to pressure from the banks 
themselves.
145
 The private equity companies with which the banks did business (and by 
which they were eventually largely owned) also played a serious role. Grouped into 
holding companies with just a few owners, these investment firms bought shares from the 
main banks at inflated prices using only the shares themselves as collateral. Through 
these “dubious and possibly fraudulent activities,” this “new capital” would appear to 
strengthen both firms’ balance sheets.
146
 
While banks’ occasionally bordered on fraud, their activities were for the most part legal. 
The wider systemic failure thus not only resulted from the actions of bankers but from the 
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inaction of regulators at the FSA and Central Bank. In fairness, the FSA was designed to 
manage retail banking and was under-resourced and understaffed considering the 
growing challenges it faced. The regulator did publish some criticisms of cross-holdings, 
lack of transparency, and other issues through 2006-2007. What actions the FSA did 
undertake were generally stifled through either political channels or private litigation.
147
  
Regulatory capture was “endemic” to the financial system: the prospectus for Icesave’s 
Dutch opening contained attestations to the strength of Iceland’s financial system by the 
Chairman of the FSA himself.
148
 Hobbled as it was by logistical and political barriers, 
the FSA simply did not make a genuine effort to determine the accuracy of balance sheets 
at major banks and equity firms.
149
 Financial institution stress tests, passed by all three 
major Icelandic banks just weeks prior to the collapse, “did not account for vulnerability 
to either a liquidity or currency crisis.”
150
  
The chair of the board of governors at the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) at this time was 
none other than David Oddsson, the former prime minister who had overseen the 
privatization of Icelandic banking in his tenure as prime minister from 1991-2004. 
Known for being domineering and manipulative, Oddsson was appointed governor by his 
protégé, Prime Minister Geir Haarde, who would eventually resign along with his 
government in January, 2009.
151
  Oddsson “has not lived outside Iceland, has no 
background in monetary economics, and understands little about international 
finance.”
152
 Legislation passed in 2000 reduced the supervisory role of the Central Bank: 
it would now merely set interest rates while banks were allowed to finance operations 
through overseas borrowing rather than deposits.
153
 
The few public bodies critical of Iceland’s financial governance were not listened to, and 
in some cases silenced. In 2002 Oddsson dismantled the National Economic Institute, 
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which reported directly to the Prime Minister’s office, after it published reports of drastic 
economic mismanagement.
154
 The University of Iceland was pressured to fund its 
Economic and Social Research Centres privately, and these bodies published much less 
critical national studies once they depended on commissioned research. It has also been 
suggested that Iceland’s public data agency, Statistics Iceland, was bullied into 
downplaying information on growing wealth and income inequality.
155
 Regulatory 
capture and corruption thus figure prominently into the narrative of Iceland’s financial 
expansion and subsequent implosion. 
3.3 Housing and Financial Asset Bubble 
In 2004 Iceland’s banks began offering mortgages at rates competitive with the 
government-run mortgage provider, the Housing Financing Fund (HFF). This is similar 
to the way private American financial firms joined Fannie and Freddie in the sub-prime 
mortgage business at the same time. Deregulation combined with the accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserves by the CBI provided a liquidity surplus which the banks put 
towards asset acquisitions and growth.
156
 Kaupthing was the first bank to offer fixed-rate 
mortgages in mid-2004. The other major banks began to do likewise, and within a year 
Iceland’s private banking sector increased its market share of home mortgages from 5% 
to 43%.
157
 As in the United States, the private banks’ lower offered rates prompted a 
surge in demand from first-time homebuyers and existing home-buyers wishing to 
refinance. Combined with a general increase in economic growth and purchasing power, 
this real estate boom drove housing prices upward.
158
  
In addition to simply borrowing too much, Iceland’s banks and their cross-owned equity 
firms often pursued “ill-considered, overpriced, and sometimes dubious, acquisitions.”
159
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Often acquired for prestige, many loss-generating businesses continued to be funded by 
Icelandic banks and equity companies to avoid the losses and potential bank run their 
bankruptcies would induce.
160
 Individual households were also encouraged to borrow 
beyond their means to a degree that has been characterized as “predatory lending,” and 
were also encouraged to convert debt held into lower-interest foreign currencies.
161
 The 
three big banks’ expanding balance sheets, worth over 800% of GDP by the end of 
2007
162
, also translated into higher and higher remunerations for owners and 
management. Much of this in turn was channeled into financial contributions to the 
governing political parties.
163
 
In July 2006 an IMF report warned that the rapid expansion of Icelandic banks’ assets 
and liabilities was a cause for concern and a source of vulnerability, by which time 
government deficits had already quadrupled to 20% of GDP since 2003.
164
 Fitch 
downgraded Iceland’s outlook from stable to negative in February 2006, triggering a 
“mini-crisis” in which the Króna lost roughly 25% of its value.
165
 This caused bank 
liabilities, many of which were denominated in foreign currencies, to increase. At this 
point “the sustainability of foreign currency debts became a ‘public’ problem, the stock 
market fell and business defaults rose.”
166
 The raising of interest rates by the Japanese 
Central Bank in July 2006 hit Icelandic financial firms hard, disrupting the international 
“carry trade” business of borrowing low-interest yen to invest in higher-yield currencies 
such as the Króna. Iceland’s currency fell 12% against the US dollar while Icelandic 
stock markets lost 20% of their value.
167
  
Iceland’s financial and political elite chided foreign critics. The Central Bank borrowed 
money in order to double foreign exchange reserves. The Chamber of commerce 
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commissioned reports from leading American and British economists, who were paid 
handsomely for their healthy prognoses of Iceland’s financial state.
168
 By autumn 
Iceland’s banks were having difficulty raising money by selling bonds, as international 
markets became wary of their rapidly expanding balance sheets.
169
  
Rather than take these financing problems as a warning the banks turned to international 
money markets to raise capital, opening internet accounts and offering high-interest retail 
banking to British and Dutch depositors. Because these operations were opened as 
branches and not subsidiaries, they were subject to regulation by the FSA rather than by 
British or Dutch authorities. Host country regulators only concerned themselves with 
branches’ liquid capital, not their assets, while the FSA virtually ignored these offshore 
operations “even as they incurred giant liabilities against the Icelandic deposit insurance 
scheme and ultimately against Icelandic taxpayers.”
170
 Over a period of 18 months, 
Landsbanki and Kaupthing collected a combined £4.8 billion and €2.9 billion from 
British and Dutch investors through their Icesave and Edge internet deposit services.
171
 
As in the US, the Icelandic banks’ rapidly-growing loans and assets were financed 
through short-term debt. Moreover, the high interest rate set by the Central Bank both 
attracted foreign investment while driving citizens to borrow from overseas institutions in 
lower-interest denominations. Foreign investors benefited not only from the rapid 
inflation of the Króna, and counted on the fact that interest rates were unlikely to be 
lowered as the resulting depreciation “would raise the already heavy burden of foreign 
currency debt of households and firms.”
172
 Short-term foreign debt outweighed the 
foreign exchange reserves, with which it might be paid, by a factor of 10 by 2007.
173
 By 
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this time household debt equaled 103% of GDP, while gross foreign debt stood between 
700-800% of GDP.
174
  
Despite the positive public relations, even the senior levels of Iceland’s government were 
growing concerned at what lay behind the banks’ balance sheets. In mid-2007 an ad-hoc 
coordination group was formed to facilitate information sharing and contingency 
planning should a financial crisis erupt. The group consisted of “officials from the Prime 
Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Banking and Commerce, the 
Central Bank and the Financial Supervisory Authority of Iceland (FME).”
175
 The group 
proved superficial, providing little real planning and reporting so ineffectively that 
government ministers were later able to avoid legal responsibility by pleading ignorance 
of the severity of the danger.
176
 
After the mini-crisis of 2006, Icelandic banks sought new forms of short-term financing 
for their liabilities. One was the creation high-interest retail banking internet services 
catering to foreign depositors. Landsbanki pioneered this move with the opening of 
Icesave, which opened in the UK in 2006 and the Netherlands in 2008. This was 
immensely successful, attracting deposits from even public and academic institutions in 
the UK, and generating the necessary capital for Landsbanki to refinance its liabilities 
while acquiring even more assets.
177
 In response to Icesave’s manifest success, Glitnir 
and Kaupthing followed suit by setting up their own internet deposit services. 
A second means of refinancing was through a program by which the three national banks 
issued debt securities to smaller regional banks, which then borrowed against these 
securities from the Central Bank without needing to provide additional collateral. The 
smaller banks would then use these loans in turn to lend to the “Big Three,” allowing 
them to indirectly borrow beyond even the generous limits imposed by the Central 
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Bank.
178
 They also set up subsidiaries in Luxembourg which performed a similar 
function by borrowing from the Central Bank of Luxembourg and the European Central 
Bank. That Iceland’s banks were provided loans using other Icelandic banks’ debts as 
collateral owes as much to a lack of prudential oversight by the Icelandic and continental 
Central Banks.
179
 This is especially true as throughout 2008 the Haarde government, and 
the Icelandic Central Bank under Oddsson, ignored alternately stern and desperate 
warnings from the IMF, British, and Scandinavian Central Banks to scale down the 
banking system.
180
 More so than in the US case, the hubris of Icelandic bankers and 
borrowers can be attributed to inexperience. However the small, closed, and corrupt 
nature of Iceland’s political and financial elite allowed them to ignore the warnings of 
those more knowledgeable than themselves. 
3.4 Financial Crisis 
The financial crisis hit Iceland along with many other economies following the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers’ at the end of September 2008.
181
 The revelation that a major 
financial firm might be allowed to fail without government intervention froze interbank 
and international money markets, evaporating liquidity and making assets 
“untradeable.”
182
 In the ensuing market panic, investors fled Iceland’s vulnerable and 
overleveraged financial system en masse. As short-run funding dried up, Iceland’s banks 
quickly slid into insolvency. Faced with a scheduled €750 million payment on October 
15, Glitnir requested an emergency loan from the Central Bank. This request was rejected 
and was met instead with an offer to inject €600 million into the bank in exchange for a 
75% ownership stake.
183
 Glitnir was taken over by the government on October 6, 
                                                 
178
 Wade and sigurgeirsdottir, “Lessons from Iceland,”20. 
179
 Wade and sigurgeirsdottir, “Lessons from Iceland,”20. 
180
 Wade and sigurgeirsdottir, “Lessons from Iceland,”21. 
181
 Wade and sigurgeirsdottir, “Lessons from Iceland,”5. 
182
 Sigurjonsson and Mixa, 212. 
183
 Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson, “Collapse of a Financial System: An Icelandic Saga,” in Lessons from the 
Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Our Economic Future, ed. Robert W. Kolb (Hoboken NJ: 
John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 545. 
42 
 
Landsbanki on October 7. Despite an 80 billion ISK loan from the government, 
Kaupthing finally collapsed on October 9.
184
 
Iceland’s stock markets lost roughly 98% of their value in 2008. In September of that 
year the government refused to bail out, and instead took over, Glitnir bank. Within a 
week the other two major Icelandic banks, Landsbanki and Kaupthing, also collapsed and 
had to be nationalised.
185
 The Icelandic Króna (ISK) had fallen from 1/70 euro to 1/190 
euro by November 2008, and average income fell from 1.6 to 0.8 times that of the US 
from 2007 to February 2009. The IMF offered a $2.5 billion loan to help stabilize the 
Króna, an offer matched by other Nordic banks.
186
 Unlike the much larger US and UK, 
Iceland’s bank losses far outweighed the government’s ability to absorb the cost of 
bailing out private institutions.  
On September 29, 2008 Glitnir appealed for Central Bank assistance, and Oddsson 
agreed to buy 75% of Glitnir’s shares in an attempt to restore confidence. Rather than 
boost confidence in the bank, this seriously damaged confidence in the Iceland itself as 
“the country’s rating plunged, and credit lines were withdrawn from Landsbanki and 
Kaupthing.”
187
 At this point Oddsson attempted to peg the Króna while cutting interest 
rates. The peg lasted only a few hours, after which point the Króna’s value plummeted. 
On October 8 UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown froze Landsbanki’s UK assets under 
anti-terrorism laws. Soon the IMF stepped in, offering a conditional loan of $2.1 billion 
to stabilize the Króna, to which the Nordic Central Banks added a conditional loan of 
$2.5 billion.
188
 Iceland’s failed experiment with financial liberalization ended essentially 
in its placement in conservatorship under its largest trading partners and the IMF.  
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3.5 Policy Response: Monetary Policy 
After the collapse of Glitnir, David Oddsson made televised statements renouncing any 
government responsibility to repay foreign depositors in Icelandic banks which further 
escalated international panic. Oddsson “then announced that Russia would provide a 
large loan, which the Russian government promptly denied.”
189
 At this point Oddsson 
announced that the Króna would be pegged to the euro, without even consulting his own 
chief economist. This policy lasted less than a day, as Iceland had almost no foreign 
exchange reserves left and no capital controls.
190
 The short-lived currency peg did, 
however, allow government and financial insiders “to spirit their money out of the Króna 
at a much more favourable rate than they would get later.”
191
 As the crisis became 
apparent, Oddsson’s erratic responses did little to calm markets. The Central Bank cut the 
interest rate to 12% on October 7, before raising it to 18% thirteen days later.
192
  
Beyond the influence of Oddsson himself, it is also true that Iceland’s Central Bank was 
largely insulated from those of other countries, even Nordic countries. Central Bank 
management and staff had few personal connections to their foreign counterparts. Most 
were trained in Iceland or the US, and many harboured a combination of nationalistic 
pride and insecurity in dealing with their larger institutional cousins in Europe.
193
 
Management was thus largely unaware “that Icelandic banking had developed a bad 
reputation in the other Nordic countries.”
194
 When the US and Nordic Central Banks 
concluded a currency swap agreement in September, 2008, Icelanders had been shocked 
to be excluded.  
The small and isolated nature of Iceland’s political and economic authorities prevented 
any real international coordination either to prevent or respond to the financial meltdown. 
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While the monetary response was erratic and did not help matters, the scale of the crisis 
was such that no domestic response could realistically have prevented a complete 
meltdown. Since defaulting on its debts, Iceland’s Central Bank has lowered interest rates 
to under 6%, maintaining the lower value of the currency and helping to renew economic 
growth.
195
 This resumption of growth has been bolstered by high global commodity 
prices.  
3.6 Policy Response: Fiscal Policy 
The period of privatization and deregulation also saw major tax cuts on business and 
financial earnings, however taxes on low- and medium-income saw major increases. This 
shift in the tax burden saw government revenues increase from 39% to 49% of GDP from 
1995-2006, which was “wrongly hailed as proof of the proposition dear to supply-side 
economics that tax cuts on business increase tax revenues.”
196
 This shift in the tax burden 
not only encouraged the rapid growth and overleveraging of firms, it also made 
government revenues much more dependent on individual households. The financial 
crisis and currency collapse decimated household finances while increasing 
unemployment, with associated rises in cost to the state welfare system.  Even before the 
crisis, government deficits had quadrupled to 20% of GDP from 2003-2006.
197
 With 
dwindling revenues and mounting liabilities, Iceland’s government had very little room to 
manoeuvre in terms of fiscal response. 
Iceland’s government was thus given little choice as to much of the spending it undertook 
in the aftermath of the meltdown. Much of the IMF loan was conditioned on repayment 
of the debt generated by Icesave to the Dutch and British governments. This repayment, 
however, was defeated by Iceland’s citizens in a referendum. Iceland’s recent successful 
bond issue in June 2011 seems to have somewhat disproved the IMF’s threat that, should 
Iceland default on these British and Dutch deposits, it would never again be able to 
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borrow internationally.
198
 Icelanders were also expected to repay the exorbitant loan 
taken out by the Central Bank in 2006. The now insolvent Central Bank was recapitalized 
using public funds equivalent to 18% of GDP, necessitating “cuts in public spending on 
health, education and infrastructure.”
199
  
3.7 Analysis 
Iceland’s meltdown demonstrates the need for strengthening cross-border banking 
oversight and deposit insurance. Loopholes in EU deposit insurance legislation were 
exposed through the exploitation of cross-border accounts and the different treatment of 
branches and subsidiaries.
200
 This reiterates the importance of informational 
transparency, and coordination among financial firms and regulators at the national and 
international level, in preventing arbitrage and the buildup of systemic risk. Wade also 
argues that the largest commercial banks should continue to be publicly owned post-crisis 
due to the “large public-good element” in their function.
201
  
The case of Iceland demonstrates an abdication of responsibility by individuals and the 
importance of accountability. The Special Investigation Commission on the causes of the 
crisis report of April 2010 accused ministers in government (including Haarde), former 
Central Bank governors, and the director of the FSA of gross negligence.
202
 The 
Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Finance was also fired for selling his holdings in 
one of the major banks immediately before the collapse.
203
 The combination of banker 
malfeasance and regulatory negligence in Iceland has close parallels in the financial crisis 
narratives of the US and UK. Iceland’s meltdown had stronger repercussions for the 
country’s population simply because the financial bubble was so much larger in 
proportion to the overall economy. 
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The scale of the financial crisis relative to Iceland’s economy precluded effective 
monetary or fiscal policy responses – Icelanders’ only choice was to start over. Finally, 
Iceland’s financial collapse demonstrates the drastic need for informational transparency 
in markets. When the financial bubble began to grow in 2003-2004 critical reports were 
being published even by the Central Bank, at which point Oddsson was put in charge. 
From 2006 to 2008 foreign criticism, especially from the IMF, grew muted just as the 
situation was becoming most volatile. This was based on the belief that “the situation had 
become so fragile that to speak of it might trigger a run on the banks which might 
otherwise be averted.”
204
  
Despite the essential freeze in government economic policy and the reformation of 
Iceland’s banks back into local retail operations (using the remaining ‘good’ assets from 
the three former large banks), recovery seems to have begun. Unemployment has 
stabilized around 6% from its average high of 8% from 2009-2010; GDP growth returned 
to above 2% in 2011 from a low of -7% in 2009 and a still-unpleasant -4% in 2010, and; 
inflation sank to about 2.8% in 2011, down from 5% in 2010 and a high of 13% in 
2008.
205
 Iceland seems to have avoided serious punishment for defaulting on its 
creditors, and it has been suggested that this could provide a model for other indebted 
European countries. There are problems with this, however.  
The first problem is that the indebted Eurozone economies do not have their own 
currencies, and so their banks’ collapse will not allow a similar fall in exchange rates to 
stimulate exports as has occurred in Iceland.
206
 Furthermore, Iceland’s status as a small 
peripheral economy means that it’s default, while upsetting some sovereign investors 
such as the British and Dutch, did not significantly contribute to global market instability 
as might a default by the US or UK. Even smaller eurozone countries such as Greece, 
should they be forced to leave the shared currency in the event of default, could trigger an 
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unraveling of the euro with drastic global consequences. To draw a parallel between 
countries and private financial institutions, Iceland was largely able to default on its 
obligations because, unlike the other case studies in this paper, it was not too big to fail. 
Finally, Icelanders may have only postponed their reckoning. Households are still highly 
indebted, especially those whose internationally-denominated loans increased as the 
exchange rate fell. Should defaults on these debts increase, as seems likely, Iceland could 
well face another debt crisis.
207
  
Iceland’s total financial collapse left little leeway for government monetary or fiscal 
policy to mitigate the damage. The short-sighted attempt at a currency peg and 
fluctuating interest rates at the CBI initially added to the panicked flight of capital out of 
the country. Shortly thereafter the Central Bank came under the close oversight of the 
IMF, which placed tight capital controls on the country’s economy and took over most 
policy decisions at the Central Bank. Capital flight from the Króna, and the lowering of 
interest rates post-crisis, have allowed a devaluation of the currency and a return to 
export-led growth. This underlines the usefulness of monetary expansion to combat event 
the worst economic contractions. Fiscal policy was also largely restricted in the wake of 
the crisis due to the cost of recapitalizing the central bank. Reduced revenues through the 
recession which followed the crisis and the attendant rise in social welfare costs added to 
the fiscal restrictions facing Iceland’s government. 
 The government decision not to bail out the banks represents a major diversion from the 
paths taken by other states, although it was largely predetermined by the incapacity of 
Iceland’s small economy and tax base to afford such action. Moreover, the default on 
international creditors is still a point of tension in relations with countries such as the UK, 
and may yet create serious repercussions for the Icelandic economy. The apparently 
(relatively) positive effects of Iceland’s monetary and fiscal responses are thus still 
uncertain, and at any rate the responses themselves were likely only feasible due to 
Iceland’s small and peripheral economic position. In terms of the onset of crisis, 
monetary and fiscal profligacy encouraged the growth of asset bubbles. The initial 
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deregulation and opening of Iceland’s financial system, especially the lifting of 
restrictions separating retail and investment banking, were necessary conditions which 
allowed these imbalances in the first place. The patronage, inexperience, concentrated 
ownership, and public-private collusion in Iceland’s financial system used the space 
allowed by deregulation to fuel Iceland’s unsustainable financial expansion – and 
eventual collapse.  
4 UNITED KINGDOM 
Considering it’s vulnerabilities as a global financial centre, the UK economy has been 
argued by some to have fared relatively well in that it performed “better than most 
observers expected,”
208
 roughly on par with other large industrialized economies.
209
 
Despite exceeding worst-case scenarios, the UK is still in difficult economic shape: GDP 
growth in 2011 averaged a meagre 1.1%, down from 1.4% in 2010, and fell back into 
recession in Q1 2012; unemployment has continued to rise, from 7.8% in 2010 to 7.9% in 
2011, and; the public budget deficit in 2011 was estimated at 8.8% of GDP while gross 
public debt stood at 79.5% of GDP, up from 76.1% in 2010.
210
  
Through the mid-2000’s the economy of the United Kingdom appeared very stable. 
Unemployment was holding at around 5%, the lowest rate since the 1970’s. GDP growth 
was historically average and inflation maintained near the 2% target.
211
 While an 
inflationary boom did not seem likely, there was concern about the rapid rise in house 
prices, the similarly rapid expansion of credit, and the growth of the financial system in 
general. The growing interdependence of global finance and the potentially increased 
vulnerability of the UK and other economies to foreign financial shocks, however, had 
not yet become a widely held source of concern.
212
 In terms of financial linkages, the UK 
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was a central nexus in global banking. Financial and business services accounted for 30% 
of GDP in the UK.
213
 Thus, “despite low public debt, the government had therefore large 
implicit banking sector liabilities like Iceland, Ireland and Switzerland.
214
 As elsewhere, 
the run-up to the crisis saw real estate lending take on a much greater proportion of 
banks’ balance sheets. This created the risk that a decline in property values could have 
considerable effects on banks solvency.
215
  
The UK case reiterates the growing themes of monetary expansion and financial 
interventions to stabilize the banking sector during a financial crisis. The lower UK 
growth following the pursuit of spending cuts, as compared with the US, also suggests 
that fiscal stimulus is preferable during a recession. The procyclicality of austerity in 
prolonging recessions gains credence here, and reinforces the Keynesian belief that debt 
repayment is most appropriate once economic growth and private demand have resumed. 
As elsewhere, an effective regulatory regime ensuring risk transparency is seen as crucial 
in preventing the buildup of systemic risk which triggered the financial crisis. 
4.1 Financial Regulation 
The rapid growth of debt-to-deposit ratios in UK banks in the early 2000’s were a result 
of weakening regulation and the rise of securitisation.
216
 Regulatory oversight of British 
banks in the lead-up to the crisis has been criticized along lines that are by now familiar. 
In the case of the UK, such criticism has emphasized a defective deposit insurance 
regime, the lack of an adequate legal framework for the resolution of insolvent banks, and 
(as in the United States) lax regulatory oversight.
217
 Northern Rock was the first major 
bank failure in the UK, a ‘canary in the coal mine’ warning of the overall vulnerability of 
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the financial sector, similar to Bear Stearns in the US. The Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) failed to properly evaluate Northern Rock’s business model, its rapid growth, and 
their associated risks. It also failed to communicate what concerns it did have to the 
Northern Rock board.
218
 Similar criticisms regarding weak regulatory oversight include 
insufficient capital requirements (especially in trading), regulations on liquidity, and 
controls on executive bonuses.
219
  
The FSA review of financial regulation published in March, 2009 (the “Turner Review”) 
recommended: extended jurisdiction of bank regulation, including oversight of capital 
adequacy and credit rating agencies; codified remuneration frameworks to discourage 
excessive risk-taking; centralized clearance of CDS trading to improve systemic 
transparency, and; closer coordination and regulation of cross-border banking.
220
 The 
British regulatory regime failed to ensure capital buffers kept up with the expansion of 
credit, gradually leading to an erosion of sufficient liquidity in individual institutions and 
the financial system as a whole.
221
 As in the US there is strong consensus on the need for 
change in financial regulation.
222
 Also like the United States, the regulatory failure in the 
UK is not solely one of insufficient regulatory legislation, but also of the executors of the 
UK regulatory regime to exercise their existing legal powers. 
The regulatory shortcomings in the UK which contributed to the financial crisis reflect 
not simply a failure of the formal regulatory framework, but a gradually-developed laxity 
in regulatory culture. British regulatory authorities are in fact mandated with broad 
powers.
223
 The poor performance of the UK’s tripartite regulatory regime - comprising 
the FSA, the Bank of England, and the Treasury – thus has as much to do with 
performance accountability as it does with an effective legal regulatory framework.  
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From 1997 to 2010, the Treasury has been responsible for overall regulatory policy 
framework, the Bank of England for financial stability, and the FSA for prudential 
supervision.
224
 The Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority report to 
Parliament and are subject to scrutiny by the Treasury Select Committee.  
In June 2010 the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer announced reforms intended to couple 
monetary policy with its private counterpart in the financial industry. These reforms 
would abolish the shared oversight responsibility of the FSA, Bank of England, and UK 
Treasury as well as dismantle the FSA itself. Under the proposed reforms, the Bank of 
England will establish a Financial Policy Committee (FPC), chaired by the BoE 
governor, to conduct macro-prudential analysis and oversight.
225
 Since mid-2009, risk 
premia for UK banks have largely returned to their pre-crisis levels, indicating that 
expectations regarding British banks’ future performance has stabilized. While overall 
lending among UK banks has not returned to pre-crisis levels, the recovery has in large 
part been stimulated by the return of lending to businesses, and “the most severe 
constraints on access to finance were short-lived.”
226
 It has been argued that government 
guarantees of financial institutions have “undoubtedly underpinned” the return of 
confidence to the UK Banking system.
227
  
The UK government seems to have taken the lesson that the high debt-to-asset leveraging 
inherent in financial capitalism requires capital protection on the scale that only 
governments can access.
228
 In exchange for this protection, the UK government is 
attempting to expand its oversight of financial services. For example, government will 
now undertake “micro-economic decisions such as regulating speculation in mortgages,” 
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issues which were previously left up to markets.
229
 The Supervisory Enhancement 
Programme is an attempt to change the regulatory model that is more “intrusive and 
direct” than the “light touch” model unofficially subscribed to prior to the crisis.
230
 The 
Financial Services Bill is currently before Parliament, and is set to move on to the House 
of Lords after its third reading in the House of Commons on May 22, 2012.
231
  
4.2 Housing and Financial Asset Bubble 
The failure of Northern Rock in September 2007 was an initial warning of the 
weaknesses in the UK financial sector. After converting to a stock bank in 1997, 
Northern Rock had grown from 6% of the UK mortgage market in 1999 to 19% in 2007, 
with assets doubling from $16 billion to $32 billion from mid-2005 to end-2007.
232
 
Northern Rock originated mortgages of low credit-quality and packaged them into 
securities to be resold. In the meantime these mortgages were ‘warehoused’ and funded 
through short-term money market liabilities. The risk-prone business model at Northern 
Rock, which dealt primarily in mortgage loans, depended more heavily on short-term 
interbank financing than that of most British banks. This business model also saw the 
bank making larger loans as a proportion of property and borrowers’ income, making 
Northern Rock that much more dependent on the maintenance and continued increase of 
property values.
233
 The run on the bank’s funding liabilities, rather than depositor 
withdrawals, reflects the exposure of UK banks to global liquidity shortages due to their 
dependence on short-term financing of liabilities. At the time of the crisis’ full onset, 
“roughly 70% of UK banks funding was at less than one-year maturity.”
234
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The UK was hit along with the rest of the financial world by the shutdown of interbank 
lending in mid-August, 2007. Despite being considered well-run and well-capitalized by 
the FSA in 2007, by September Northern Rock faced severe difficulty rolling over its 
short-term financing obligations.
235
 On September 13, 2007, news broke that the Bank of 
England had made a deal to bail out Northern Rock. By the next day depositors and 
investors were flocking to withdraw their money from Northern Rock in Britain’s first 
bank run since 1866, which only ended when the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced 
a government guarantee of the bank’s deposits.
236
 Private and public takeovers were 
discussed through the winter and in February, 2008 Northern Rock was formally 
nationalised. The bank’s annual report in March would subsequently reveal a £167 
million loss.
237
 
HBOS is a British banking and insurance company which grew significantly through 
several mergers from 1995 through 2001, during which time it also became a publicly 
traded company. Dealing primarily with mortgages, HBOS became an increasingly 
aggressive consumer lender through the early 2000’s, covering roughly half of its 
liabilities through deposits and the other half through wholesale markets and 
securitisation, including repackaging mortgages and trading in CDO’s and CDF’s.  By 
September 2008 HBOS’s liabilities outstripped internal revenue by £200 billion and 
required £20 billion per year to refinance.
238
 The Royal Bank of Scotland was an even 
larger UK bank. RBS was the world’s fifth largest bank at its peak, the tenth largest 
company in the world in 2000. From 2004-2009 it was second largest shareholder in the 
Bank of China, which itself was the fifth-largest bank in the world by February 2008.
239
  
RBS entered the investment banking field in 2000, becoming a dominant player in 
leveraged finance in the UK and Europe. RBS’ Global Banking and Markets division 
(GBM) made huge profits trading ABS, MBS and investment-grade corporate bonds. In 
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so doing, RBS was “building significant exposure to the activities that were at the heart 
of the global banking maelstrom of 2007/8.”
240
 By March 2007, GBM was the world’s 
second largest issuer of subprime mortgages. Unfortunately for RBS, the financial crisis 
began to grow just as it was also pursuing an expensive (at £49 billion) and ill-conceived 
takeover of ABM Amro, the Netherlands’ largest bank.
241
 British banking closely 
paralleled the increase in leveraged MBS investment seen in the US and Iceland, with 
similar results when the market for those securities collapsed. 
4.3 Financial Crisis 
In 1998 the UK’s biggest eight banks lent out less than they held in deposits, whereas by 
2008 their loans exceeded deposits by over £500 billion.
242
 British Banks’ acquired debt 
was also largely in CDO’s which they repackaged into SIV’s (their source of rising 
profits) and resold, leaving them extremely exposed to fluctuations in the US housing 
market. Through early 2008 weakening house prices and CDS, CDO and MBS (“alphabet 
soup”) markets created worries that asset write-downs might leave banks without 
sufficient capital.
243
 Bank share prices were falling markedly by March, 2008, and in 
April banks released profit warnings. HBOS was seen as especially exposed to risk which 
drove away investors. The bank’s share price fell from 450 pence in March 2008 to 283 
pence by September 12, at which point a run saw it fall to 88 pence in three days.
244
  
By April 2008 RBS was facing £5.9 billion in lost value from write-downs in toxic asset 
values, and attempted to shore up its reserves through rights issues and the selling off of 
subsidiaries.
245
 By the end of the year losses had risen to roughly £20 billion. Even 
without these write-downs, RBS faced trading losses of £7-8 billion in 2008. Altogether, 
RBS lost £28 billion in 2008, the largest annual corporate loss in UK history. When these 
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figures were released in January, 2009, RBS shares fell 66% in a single trading day to 
10.9p per share. This in itself was a 97% drop from RBS’ peak 2008 share price of 354p 
per share.
246
 At the same time official data showed the UK to be in recession for the first 
time since the early 1990’s.
247
 These losses help convey a sense of the rapidity and 
severity of the banking crisis UK, and it had become clear that RBS could not remain 
viable without government intervention.  
4.4 Policy Response: Financial 
Interventions 
The Northern Rock Crisis prompted legislative changes to allow faster intervention and 
resolution of bank failures, before formal bankruptcy proceedings were initiated.
248
 
Northern Rock had already been nationalised in February, and in September HBOS was 
in a similar state of emergency. Lloyds TSB was identified as a preferred takeover 
partner. Unlike its British contemporaries, Lloyds had focused on its core businesses with 
a low-risk business model. Lloyds TSB had limited exposure to US subprime ABS 
markets, a much lower ratio of liabilities to deposits, and in general had “avoided 
building an investment bank.”
249
 On September 27, 2008 it was announced that Lloyds 
would conduct an all-share takeover of HBOS. The UK government agreed to waive 
competition concerns in light of the extreme circumstances.
250
 The government also 
made a secret loan of £25 billion to HBOS at this time which was not revealed until the 
following year.
251
  
The banking UK banking crisis prompted the government to undertake actions in early 
October, 2008 similar to those in the US. £50 billion was allocated to recapitalize failing 
banks through government purchase of non-voting preference shares. In addition, £200 in 
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T-bills was made available to be exchanged for illiquid but high-quality securitized 
assets.
252
 On October 13, 2008 the government announced £37 billion worth of capital 
injections to bailout Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB and HBOS. The government’s 
holdings of bank shares came to 60% of RBS and over 40% of Lloyds’ post-merger 
equity.
 253
  The government’s share of Lloyds’ equity would later reach 57%.
254
 It should 
also be noted that both Lloyds and HBOS shares fell sharply upon news of their merger, 
as one of the UK’s strongest and most conservative banks was pressured by the 
government to acquire one of the riskiest and most highly-leveraged.
255
 Government 
guarantees to banks dwarfed the figures relating to direct acquisitions, totalling £400 
billion in loss insurance on banks’ loans and toxic assets.
256
 These guarantees 
underpinned the Government Asset Protection Scheme, the corollary of the TARP 
program in the US.
257
 
Government intervention to prop up systemically important banks (or force their merger) 
reiterated the longer-term issue of moral hazard as such actions imply a commitment by 
public authorities to rescue banks from insolvency. This issue is still a concern, as the 
Banking Act of 2009 “does not clarify whether or in what circumstances the Bank of 
England should act as ‘lender of last resort’.”
258
  The 2009 Banking Act did however 
enhance the crisis management powers of financial regulators by standardizing the 
resolution process of insolvent banks and clearly outlines government authority in 
facilitating mergers, acquisitions, or nationalisations of failing institutions.
259
 
Government financial interventions in the UK were more proactive than in the US or 
Iceland, representing a greater willingness to support systemically important institutions. 
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However the higher proportion of British GDP represented by financial services also 
made this an easier choice for the government.  
4.5 Policy Response: Monetary Policy 
The potential for a systemic credit market failure of the type following Lehman’s demise 
in September, 2008 had been considered by UK policymakers since the first signs of 
crisis in 2007. The European Central Bank had begun a policy of liquidity injections into 
the financial system in August 2007 in response to the trouble at France’s BNP Paribas, 
foreshadowing the later responses by the British and American governments. In the UK, 
this shift toward direct financial intervention occurred subsequent to the nationalisation 
of Northern Rock in October, 2007.
260
 To avoid a repeat of the Great Depression, 
policymakers in the UK undertook to a) issue public guarantees on deposits and assets to 
save banks from collapse, and b) increase the money supply to offset the deflationary 
pressures of a credit market freeze.
261
 
In early 2009 the Bank of England lowered the prime lending rate to the current 0.5% to 
ease the constraints on credit availability. It also undertook a Quantitative Easing 
program of asset purchases worth £200 billion, which has since been raised to £325 
billion.
262
 These additional asset purchases provide liquidity to financial firms and 
private investors, injecting electronically created money into the economy to stimulate 
investment. Quantitative Easing is typically undertaken as additional stimulus once the 
prime interest rate approaches zero and cannot be further reduced. These actions were 
unprecedented for the Bank of England: the lending rate had never previously been set 
below 2%.
263
 This monetary expansion generated the greatest depreciation of the pound 
sterling since the UK first abandoned the gold standard in 1931.
264
 The depreciation of 
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the pound is also argued to have allowed the UK to benefit from the global economic 
recovery to a greater extent than other economies.
265
  
As elsewhere, fear of deflationary pressure on currency resulting from restricted liquidity 
was a primary concern driving the monetary response.
266
 Deflation has still occurred 
however, with prices in the UK continuing to hover around 82% of 2005 levels and 
exchange rates to the US dollar similar to those seen in the recession of 2000-2001.
267
 
The saving grace for the UK has been the stability of the euro against depreciations in the 
British pound and American dollar. This has generated a relative depreciation of the 
pound in relation to the bulk of UK trading partners: the continental European 
economies.
268
 With little recovery since the deflationary peak in Q1 2009, the monetary 
response may be able to claim some credit in stabilising prices and exchange rates. The 
policy response has not been able to achieve a substantial recovery to anything near pre-
crisis levels, however the unsustainable nature of pre-crisis conditions may render these 
unfair criteria for defining ‘recovery’.  
4.6 Policy Response: Fiscal Policy 
Along with monetary expansion, the crisis also necessitated government fiscal support to 
resume economic growth. The UK is now struggling alongside other major economies to 
reduce the structural deficits resulting from fiscal stimulus. While discretionary budget 
changes after the fall of 2008 were relatively small and time-limited, automatic stabilisers 
greatly increased both public spending and public sector borrowing.
269
 The Labour 
government’s fiscal policy dating from 1997 was at this point “temporarily suspended” 
until 2015-16. The UK budget deficit represented 2.6% of GDP in 2007, 4.7% in 2008, 
and 10.9% in 2009 as nondiscretionary spending increased against a shrinking GDP.
270
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The Fiscal Responsibility Act 2010 subsequently mandated that public deficits must 
shrink as a proportion of GDP every fiscal year from 2011 to 2016, and must be halved 
from 2010-2014. A general election in May, 2010, saw Labour replaced by a 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government, which announced plans to 
accelerate deficit reduction through reduced spending, or ‘austerity.’
271
 
The UK government’s austerity program is predicated on economic projections wherein 
reductions in public spending, and thus demand, are offset by rises in private 
expenditure.
272
 The argument for reducing deficits has been largely based on the fear of 
higher borrowing costs stemming from reduced national credit ratings. The UK Coalition 
government, including the Chancellor of the Exchequer, has used Greece as an example 
of this danger scenario.
273
 However, Greece’s inability to pay its debts stems largely 
from its lack of a national currency (discussed in the section on Greece in this paper), 
while the UK can “print money” through the Bank of England to service its national 
debt.
274
 At least in the short term, this ability to pay the interest on its sovereign debt 
allows the UK to avoid the wrath of international credit rating agencies. While long term 
inflation is a danger in this scenario, the necessity of avoiding deflation, maintaining 
credit availability, and ultimately stimulating investment, would seem to support such 
actions in the short term. In comparison with the recovery of growth in the US, the recent 
return to recession in the UK implies the wisdom of a Keynesian stimulus approach. 
4.7 Analysis 
One difference in circumstances between the US and UK was their mortgage market 
structure. The majority of UK mortgages are variable rate loans, which are much more 
easily influenced by the Bank of England’s prime interest rate than typically fixed-rate 
American mortgages. By substantially reducing the base lending rate between fall 2008 
and spring 2009, the Bank of England was thus able to indirectly reduce mortgage costs, 
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mitigating foreclosures and easing downward pressure on property prices.
275
 This was 
important because of the harsher repercussions for mortgage default in the UK, because 
of which many homeowners would be more desperate to avoid foreclosure. In addition, 
more limited capacity to keep up with demand for increased housing in the UK during the 
boom translated into less excess supply when the market collapsed. Thus property prices 
would not fall as drastically in the UK as in the US.
276
 However, as the banks’ balance 
sheets (excluding Lloyd’s) were invested heavily in American MBS’s, the UK financial 
sector was exposed to house price fluctuations to a greater degree than would be the case 
if they were more heavily focused in UK mortgage markets. 
A rough consensus has emerged regarding the various factors which led to the financial 
crisis, with the rapid growth of credit in the absence of adequate capital seen as the 
primary factor.
277
 Flawed risk management, pricing errors (especially based on dubious 
credit ratings), weak corporate governance and imbalanced compensation schemes, and 
opaque systemic and counterparty transparency all contributed to this trend, while 
reinforcing and overlapping with each other.
278
 On balance, the more proactive stance of 
the UK government regarding financial interventions and monetary expansion has helped 
stabilize the financial sector. However, fiscal austerity has exacerbated the still-skittish 
investment climate and resulted in recession for the overall economy. As fiscal response 
is the primary difference between the US and UK cases, the return to growth in the 
former and recession in the latter implies an important role for fiscal stimulus despite the 
laudable aims of reducing public deficits. This is especially true considering the apparent 
ambivalence of credit rating agencies to increasing government debts, at least in countries 
with monetary policy autonomy. The Greek case demonstrates that, when monetary 
expansion is not an option, the effects of public debt and on national credit ratings and 
economic recovery are drastically different.  
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5 GREECE 
The Greek economy has been hit particularly hard by the global economic crisis – it is 
now in its fifth consecutive year of recession. High public spending combined with 
economic recession and skyrocketing borrowing rates have drastically increased Greek 
sovereign debt, which already represented over 100% of GDP prior to the crisis. Greek 
membership in the Euro currency zone has complicated the country’s situation by 
limiting the options for both monetary and fiscal response. Monetary policy is severely 
constricted as the government cannot print money to stimulate the economy and inflate 
its currency, which would reduce the burden of Greek-denominated debts and encourage 
exports. The need to pay its debts has forced Greece to take loans from the EU and IMF, 
which are conditioned upon drastic reductions in public spending. Greek fiscal policy is 
also thus severely constricted at precisely the time when Keynesian theory would argue 
for fiscal stimulus.  
The uncertainty surrounding Greek austerity politics, bailouts, and a possible exit from 
the Euro have kept markets fearful. This has driven up the cost of borrowing for Greece 
and driven away investment. The Greek economic crisis is thus a sovereign debt crisis 
resulting from government overspending and the policy restrictions of a shared currency, 
rather than a result of mismanagement in the financial industry. Similar themes are 
discernible however. Greek deficits and debt were misrepresented in the country’s bid to 
enter and remain in the Euro-zone, obfuscating debt levels in breach of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) outlined in the Maastricht treaty.
279
 This can be seen as an, albeit 
indirect, misrepresentation of risk in that Greece took on liabilities it had little hope of 
financing in the absence of monetary policy discretion. Crisis resulting from the 
reassessment of underestimated (and misrepresented) risk is thus a broader theme which 
ties the Greek case to the others in this paper. Shortcomings in fiscal oversight at the 
European level – failure to effectively monitor member country finances and debt - here 
correlate to macro-prudential failures at the national regulatory level in other cases. The 
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severity of recession in the absence of either monetary or fiscal stimulus reinforces the 
Keynesian position that these are effective tools in moderating economic contractions. 
5.1 Governance of State Finances 
Greece’s public administration is characterized by an executive branch with strong 
constitutional powers but relatively weak capacity to implement policies. This stems from 
a lack of centralized resources and relative operational independence at the ministry 
level. Poor intra-governmental coordination is exacerbated by heavily bureaucratic 
ministry apparatus which are significantly influenced by unions.
280
 Convoluted 
budgetary accounting practices not only make isolating and altering budgetary priorities 
difficult, they also create “much scope for clientelistic and corrupt practices.”
281
 Under 
such conditions tax evasion has also become a major issue in Greece. Almost a third of 
tax revenues, representing 3.4% of GDP, went uncollected in 2006.
282
 Clientelism also 
characterizes labour relations in Greece. The main unions represent primarily a core of 
public sector workers, with low unionization in the private sector. Employers and 
workers of Greece’s few large firms are over-represented, while the many “small and 
micro-enterprises” enjoy neither effective representation nor regulation.
283
  
State institutions in Greece suffer from “chronic mismanagement and endemic 
corruption.”
284
 The extensive government bureaucracy makes Greece an unappealing 
investment market and a difficult place to do business – a World Bank survey ranked 
Greece the lowest of any OECD country in terms of ease of doing business.
285
 Structural 
unemployment before the crisis was already high, especially among the young. This has 
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resulted in a large informal economy, representing almost 30% of GDP.
286
 Government 
provision of services is also strongly defended yet ineffective: the Greek government 
provides health care and free education, yet Greece also sees more private spending on 
health and education than any other EU country.
287
 Greek political economy has typically 
favoured “anti-competitive regulation, barriers to entry, relatively cheap labour and stable 
product demand.”
288
 Greece’s culture of clientelist statism and jealous protection of the 
public sector has created an economic environment extremely resistant to reform. This 
has contributed to extreme political unrest in response to Government austerity measures. 
5.2 Sovereign Debt Bubble 
Greek sovereign debt can be seen as an asset bubble because investors extended the 
Greek government easy credit at rates below what government finances should have 
incurred, indicating an overestimation of the value of holding Greek debt.
289
 Greece’s 
lack of economic competitiveness and barriers to reform rendered it extremely vulnerable 
to the global economic crisis. Greece became the twelfth member of the Euro-zone in 
January 2001. A shared currency was expected to stabilize prices, control inflation 
variability and allow longer-term economic planning and projections. This in turn would 
lower borrowing costs for Greece, which had a history of high and variable inflation.
290
 
Accession did significantly lower borrowing rates, represented by bond yields, and 
inflation, which averaged 3.3% from 2001-2007 as compared to 9.39% from 1991-
2000.
291
 GDP growth also increased after accession, averaging around 4% from 2001-
2008, compared to 2.36% from 1991-2000.
292
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Despite these short-term benefits, structural problems continued to affect the Greek 
Economy. Government deficits consistently exceeded the 3% of GDP figure outlined in 
the SGP, while total government debt was maintained at roughly 125% of GDP since the 
early 2000’s and surpassed 140% of GDP in 2009.
293
 This was largely related to rigid 
public sector wages. Politicians are not only under extreme pressure from unions to 
maintain wage levels, but also use public sector jobs to generate support during elections. 
When seeking to reduce government debt (or simply mitigate its increase), Greece has 
generally opted to sell public assets or increase taxes rather than decrease spending.
294
 
Greek public expenditure as a proportion of GDP rose from roughly 45% in 2001 to over 
50% by 2009, while deficits rose from 4.63% to 15.55% of GDP over the same period.
295
 
Greek accession to the Euro also precipitated a decline in competitiveness. While 
inflation rates were historically low for Greece, they averaged 1% higher than the Euro-
zone average from 2001-2009. Wages also increased faster than the Euro-zone average. 
Relatively high costs for goods and labour reduced Greek competitiveness, reflected by 
the current account deficit which increased from over 7% of GDP in 2001 to almost 15% 
in 2007-2008.
296
 Because of its membership in the Euro-zone, Greece could not employ 
monetary policy to offset this decline in competitiveness by devaluing its currency.
297
 
Growing budget deficits likewise restricted the scope of potential fiscal policy responses 
in the event of economic slowdown, while rigid labour markets reduced the real 
economy’s flexibility to deal with a decline in growth. Finally, the enormous proportion 
of GDP dependent on non-discretionary government spending meant that reductions in 
tax revenue in the event of recession would put severe pressure on already-strained public 
finances. 
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5.3 Financial Crisis 
Greece initially saw few direct effects of the financial crisis which began in August 2007, 
which saw yields on Greek bonds increase only mildly. International concerns about 
Greek public finances were sparked in October 2009 when the newly-elected socialist 
government revealed that Greek deficits were much higher than originally thought. 
Previously reported at 3.6% of GDP for 2009, the figure was updated to 12.8% of GDP. 
This figure would further rise to 13.6% by April, 2010.
298
 Other estimates place the 2009 
deficit at 15.55% of GDP, while total government debt represented 142% of GDP.
299
 An 
EU Commission report in January 2010 revealed “incorrect data, non-transparency, 
improperly documented bookkeeping,” and a general abdication of responsibility by the 
National Statistical Service.
300
 It became clear that the statistics agency had 
misrepresented Greek fiscal conditions, reporting false deficits which appeared to 
conform to EU convergence criteria. As debt crises struck other small economies, such as 
Dubai in November 2009, international financial markets grew much more risk-averse. 
Greek fiscal and trade imbalances became a focus of intense speculation.
301
 
By December 2009 international financial markets were concerned over a potential Greek 
default. The three major credit rating agencies repeatedly downgraded Greek bonds, 
which were judged by Standard & Poor to have reached ‘junk’ status by April, 2010. 
Bond yield spreads rose sharply, reaching 15.3% on two-year bonds.
302
 By May, 2010 
interest on 10-year bonds had reached 38% and default seemed “imminent.”
303
 Questions 
were raised as to whether Greece would be driven into sovereign default if it could not 
pay its debts. The deficit revelation was a serious concern for international financial 
markets in assessing Greece’s borrowing capacity, as well as for the Euro-zone which 
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depends on data reported by member states in forming policy.
304
 Tellingly, the Greek 
bailout of 2010 stipulated that the statistics bureau must be made independent of the 
government.  
5.4 Contagion through market uncertainty 
To a far greater degree than that seen in this paper’s other case studies, the Greek 
experience was strongly influenced by exogenous policy responses to the crisis. This 
stems from the fact that Greece is part of the European Union and, more specifically, the 
Euro-zone. As institutions whose memberships consist of sovereign states, the EU and 
Euro-zone labour under a state of “policy conditionality” rather than “policy 
coherence.”
305
 Governance institutions in the Euro-zone have limited capacity to react to 
a crisis of the present magnitude, “lacking the capacity for speedy reaction, policy 
discretion and centralized action.”
306
 The Maastricht treaty forbade excessive deficits but 
included no legal instruments to intervene and impose austerity on errant states. Such 
enforced austerity has been a condition of bailouts to European states, especially Greece, 
although such bailouts were theoretically prohibited by Maastricht. This institutional 
unpreparedness created extreme uncertainty in the face of the Greek crisis, which was 
exacerbated by the slow response of the ECB and Euro-zone member states.  
Euro-zone governments agreed to the principle of a joint IMF-EU bailout for Greece in 
late March, 2010. By the end of April Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou 
requested the plan be enacted, and on May 2 Greece was extended the first installment of 
a €110 billion rescue loan.
307
 The Greek bailout was not simply intended to stabilize 
Greek finances – German and French banks held Greek debt which was backed by 
guarantees from those countries’ governments.
308
 Germany, France, Italy, and other 
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Euro-zone governments held stakes in a combined €80 billion of Greek debt.
309
 A Greek 
default would also require restructuring the Euro, which would in turn devalue Eurozone 
bonds as well.
310
 These transmission paths of contagion from Greece to European 
national bond markets and the Euro itself generated fears of the havoc a Greek default 
could wreak on the rest of Europe, despite the small proportion of European GDP 
represented by the Greek economy.
311
  
Without the rescue loan Greece would certainly collapse, possibly taking the Euro down 
with it. But even the May, 2010 ‘rescue’ was at best a temporary solution. Standard & 
Poor estimated Greek debt to reach 144% of GDP by 2015, although it actually reached 
this figure by 2010. Greek debt in 2010 is estimated to be 165.4% of GDP, a figure not 
previously projected until 2016 at the earliest.
312
 Greece is now borrowing just to pay 
interest on its debt. 
5.5 Monetary Expansion, Fiscal 
contraction 
While individual Euro-zone countries lacked the institutional independence to engage in 
monetary policy responses, there was action at inter- and supra-national levels. In the 
week following the Greek bailout loan announced on May 2, Euro-zone governments 
agreed to a €750 billion bailout guarantee to restore confidence in the currency’s weaker 
members. This was supplemented by a €321 billion commitment from the IMF and a deal 
with the US Federal Reserve to increase dollar availability through liquidity swaps.
313
 
The ECB used this liquidity to begin buying public and private debt, reversing its earlier 
conservative stance and lowering collateral standards to allow it to absorb higher-risk 
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assets such as Greek bonds. While this temporarily increased liquidity, the hesitance at 
buying Euro-zone government bonds remained.
314
 Despite the avoidance of a short-term 
liquidity crunch, the issue of central government debt and likely inability to pay remains 
a dominant factor in financial markets’ aversion to Greek bonds. The EU-IMF ‘rescue’ 
packages are in fact loans, which have increased short-term liquidity into the system but 
have added to the debt overhang at the heart of Greek solvency problems.  
5.6 Austerity and Politics 
The austerity measures imposed on Greece as a condition of its bailouts are intended to 
reign in public spending and reduce deficits in the hopes of increasing market confidence 
in Greek fiscal solvency. The Stability and Growth Programme proposed by Greece to 
the EU in May 2010 called for budget cuts equivalent to 8.6% of GDP. Pensions, salaries, 
and jobs in the public sector were to be cut, while protected industries would be 
liberalized. The union response to this was strong, with truckers and maritime workers 
shutting down the countries transport infrastructure. By July 2010 public sector unions 
had called six general strikes.
315
 Rioting has also been widespread, especially in the run-
up to the February, 2012 elections.  
An additional €130 billion EU-IMF loan was approved in March 2012, and Greece’s 
private creditors have agreed to significant value write-downs and refinancing. Greek 
avoidance of a sovereign default is dependent upon access to these funds, which in turn 
are conditional upon robust fiscal austerity measures. As in the UK, growth projections 
under austerity are predicated on the replacement of public expenditure with private 
investment to stimulate demand. However the pro-austerity government elected in 
February has already fallen. Subsequent elections in early May proved inconclusive.
316
 
The uncertainty generated by the political contest over austerity measures has kept 
markets sceptical regarding the likelihood of sustained austerity, and by extension the 
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likelihood that Greece will avoid default.
317
 Greek borrowing costs have thus remained 
high, while investment has continued to be scarce. The lack of private investment has 
exacerbated the economic effects of austerity, resulting in socio-economic dislocation 
which adds to the political pressure against austerity.  
The result of this vicious cycle has yet to be seen, however none of the potential 
outcomes are particularly positive. Either anti-austerity political and social forces will 
gain power, in which case they will attempt to renegotiate the terms of the EU-IMF 
bailout. Should they succeed, confidence in Euro-zone governance will likely be further 
damaged. Should they fail, Greece will likely default on its sovereign debt and potentially 
have to leave the Euro. In this case, a precedent will have been set for member country 
debt defaults, increasing the perceived risk relating to bond markets in other highly-
indebted Euro-zone countries. In this sense, the Euro-zone faced its own “Lehman 
moment” in 2010.
318
 Greek collapse would be perceived to herald the possibility of 
similar outcomes elsewhere, and shake confidence in Euro-zone bond markets the same 
way Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy shattered investor confidence in highly leveraged 
financial firms. This could precipitate a further expansion of the Euro-zone sovereign 
debt crisis as capital flees the bond markets of highly-indebted countries such as Ireland, 
Portugal, Italy, and Spain. Contagion thus stems from counterparty risk reappraisal by 
creditors, whether the borrower is a financial firm or a national government. 
The less likely scenario of a new pro-austerity government in Greece is systemically 
preferable – the execution of the EU-IMF bailout proposal would likely allow Greece to 
stay in the Euro. This course of action could avert a system-wide expansion of the crisis. 
However, that may provide little solace to Greeks forced to muddle through a long and 
painful recovery under the twin burdens of fiscal austerity and the competitive challenge 
of an overvalued currency. 
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5.7 Analysis 
The revision of fiscal data since October, 2009 created a strong reaction in financial 
markets and drove up yields on Greek bonds. This represents a market correction against 
the previous overvaluation of Greek debt based on erroneous data. Gibson et al. have 
found that in the period from 2001 to mid-2009, spreads on bond yields between Greek 
and German bonds were significantly lower than should have been expected according to 
economic fundamentals. That is, Greek bonds were overvalued and their yields were 
artificially low. Following the revision of fiscal data starting in mid-2009, financial 
markets seem to have overcorrected in the opposite direction. By September 2010, the 
same researchers found spreads on Greek bond yields to be almost 50% higher than could 
be justified by economic fundamentals.
319
  
Informational non-transparency played a significant role in the Greek crisis in the form of 
misrepresentations by the national statistics agency. The European Commission has since 
proposed to undertake greater oversight of Euro-zone countries’ budgets, including 
assessing national statistics agencies.
320
 This type of governance relates to national debt 
levels rather than private firms’ risk evaluations. However sovereign debt, economic 
growth, and trade imbalances largely reflect a country’s risk of default. Greek 
membership in the Euro-zone was predicated on levels of debt and deficits incongruent 
with economic growth and competitiveness, due to the large role of inflexible public 
spending in the Greek economy. Greece concealed its spending and debt levels in order 
to stay in the Euro, membership in which denied it the monetary policy flexibility 
required to respond to its debt crisis.  
Low interest rates and the perception of stability resulting from accession to the Euro 
lowered Greek borrowing costs from 2001-2009. Like American, British, and Icelandic 
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banks, the Greek government could have used this period of growth to reduce its debt and 
consolidate its finances along countercyclical, Keynesian lines. Instead, all four 
squandered this opportunity by borrowing further. Private financial firms increased 
leveraging by acquiring assets – the Greek government ran deficits to increase public 
sector expenditures. The key link is that both were able to maintain low borrowing costs 
by misrepresenting the scope and scale of their liabilities. Revelations of financial 
mismanagement spurred dramatic risk reappraisals, causing an international run on Greek 
bonds, not unlike the capital flight from over-leveraged financial institutions elsewhere. 
Thus, the issues of informational transparency and institutional accountability are at the 
heart of governance reforms necessary to prevent future crises whether the subject is 
private corporations or national governments. 
A final word is necessary on the exogenous role of foreign financial firms in the Greek 
crisis. The highly influential role of American credit rating agencies in the evaluation of 
assessment and reassessment of sovereign risk is striking. The emerging power these 
private firms can exert over sovereign states is a newly recognized and often criticized 
dynamic.
321
 Moreover, the drastic over- and subsequent under-valuing of Greek debt was 
not solely due to fiscal misrepresentation by the state. French and German financial firms 
had also “flooded” Greece with cheap credit upon its accession to the Eurozone. It has 
been suggested that these firms, holding over $100 billion in Greek debt, sought to 
exacerbate the crisis to force a bailout and prevent Greece from defaulting.
322
 The short 
selling of Greek sovereign debt through Credit Default Swaps (CDS), essentially betting 
that Greece would default, further drove market concerns and contributed to the sense of 
panic which prompted the bailout.
323
 European financial firms thus also engaged in what 
might be described as predatory lending, in this case to the Greek state rather than 
individual households. 
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The role of ratings agencies as de facto macro-prudential oversight bodies entails extreme 
moral hazard. This represents an insufficient system of ad hoc international financial 
governance since these institutions and their corporate partners have major stakes in the 
success or failure (through short selling) of the firms and markets whose risk they assess. 
The role of investment firms in driving the crisis is potentially even more serious. It has 
been charged that once French and German firms holding Greek debt began to face losses 
on this investment they endeavoured to drive the crisis to the point where a bailout was 
necessary, thus transferring their losses to European taxpayers.
324
 Indeed, a national 
government can be seen as the ultimate form of an institution which is ‘too-big-to-fail.’ 
Regardless of crisis manipulation by private firms, Greek policy going into the crisis 
bears criticism. High public and private debt was the trigger of the sovereign debt crisis. 
Yet these factors would have nevertheless restricted the scope of fiscal policy in the case 
of an economic crisis transmitted through trade channels. Growing trade deficits certainly 
worsened the crisis, however it was the increasing difficulty of the government to borrow 
which undermined public spending, the lynchpin of the Greek economy. Keynesian and 
neoliberal theories would differ on the propriety of deficit spending during recession, but 
neither would favour the deficit spending during times of growth exhibited by Greece 
(and the US, UK, and Iceland) in the period from 2001 to 2007. Greek deficits in this 
period averaged over 5.8% of GDP, compared to about 1.7% for the Eurozone as a 
whole.
325
  
Greek political culture was incapable of lowering the public share of GDP, while this fact 
was hidden in the interests of Eurozone membership. Such membership was in turn what 
allowed the access to easy credit from European financial markets which drove the Greek 
debt bubble. It was thus this initial lack of informational transparency, exacerbated by 
institutional profligacy (in this case, by the state), which can be seen as the primary cause 
of the Greek meltdown. Without this misrepresentation of debt, Greece would not have 
been allowed into the eurozone, and would thus have not been subject to the monetary 
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and fiscal constraints which have thrown Greece into depression – and the European 
currency zone into crisis. Monetary and fiscal policy responses have thus not been 
available to Greece, resulting in it facing the worst recession of any case in this paper. 
This reiterates the usefulness of Keynesian stimulus tools in softening the impact of 
recession. Interestingly, the bailout of institutions (countries) which are ‘too big to fail’ 
has occurred at the European level, and has been essentially in preventing a Greek default 
which would likely unravel the European currency as it currently exists. The overarching 
importance of regulatory oversight and coordination to ensure risk transparency to avoid 
sharp, painful market corrections through the reevaluation of risk is once again made 
clear in the Greek case. 
6 CANADA 
That Canada experienced the global recession is clear – Canadian GDP shrank by 2.77% 
in 2009, after growing only 0.69% in 2008.
326
 Data from the Bank of Canada shows 
steep initial drops in both exports and investment at the onset of the global recession, 
mirroring conditions in the United States.
327
 Despite this initially steep economic dip, 
Canada’s economy recovered faster than in any previous recession despite a lag in export 
and investment recovery. Household balance sheets declined by 8.7% from 2007-2009, 
compared to 26.6% in the US.
328
 In fact, domestic demand was supported instead 
through increased household and government spending.  
Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies were employed to weather the collapse of 
global demand and credit, and this was possible because “Business and household 
balance sheets were relatively sound, and the banking system was robust, managed 
prudently, and sufficiently capitalized.”
329
 The potential scope of government policy 
                                                 
326
 World Bank, “World Databank,” Accessed May 25, 2012. 
327
 Jean Boivin, “The ‘Great’ Recession in Canada: Perception vs. Reality,” (Speech Delivered to the 
Montreal CFA Society, Montreal, Quebec, March 28, 2011): 4. Accessed January 27, 2012. 
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2011/03/speeches/great-recession-canada-perception-reality/. 
328
 Statistics Canada, “Chapter 9: Economic Accounts,” Canada Yearbook 2011 (2011): 120, accessed 
April 25, 2012. http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-402-x/2011000/pdf/economic-economique-eng.pdf. 
329
 Boivin, “The ’Great’ Recession in Canada,” 4. 
74 
 
response has lessened however, as interest rates approach the zero lower-bound, while 
public and household debt are now much higher due to the recession and government 
response. Moreover, structural vulnerabilities such as growing household debt, a 
domestic housing bubble, and exposure to the continued global downturn - especially 
through the European debt crisis and demand spillovers from the United States - present 
continuing challenges moving forward.
330
 
Despite these greater long-term challenges, the initial Canadian preparation for and 
response to the recent recession has been relatively successful in mitigating the worst 
effects of economic shock. Canada did not experience a collapse in the housing market, 
or anywhere near the scale of job losses, as seen in the United States.
331
 Stimulating 
demand through household and public deficit spending during a recession reflects a 
distinctly Keynesian approach, as does the increase in private and government savings 
(deficit reduction) during the pre-recession commodity boom.
332
 Moreover, the strong 
financial sector regulation historically seen in Canada favours a statist, interventionist 
perspective over the dominant neoliberal, deregulatory paradigm of the last two decades. 
Canada’s strong financial regulation and prior fiscal restraint resemble the policies 
favoured by international financial institutions such as the European Central Bank and the 
IMF.  
Canada’s superior performance through the financial crisis and recession thus 
demonstrates the combination of effective monetary and fiscal policy responses, as well 
as timely and deliberate financial interventions. Crucially, the Canadian case also 
demonstrates the effect of sound financial regulatory governance in mitigating the onset 
of financial crisis in the first place. A much higher proportion of Canadian financial 
assets fell under the regulated banking sector versus the unregulated “shadow” banking in 
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over-the-counter securities which gained such large market shares in the US, UK, and 
Iceland. This drastically reduced the effects of the collapse in American real estate values 
in Canada, while prudent corporate and regulatory governance helped maintain stability 
in Canadian housing prices. Canada’s more muted  experience of the financial and 
economic crisis thus correlates to successful implementation of all four policy variables 
examines in this paper, with the key variable of sound financial regulation also limiting 
exposure to the US-generated crisis. 
6.1 Financial Regulation  
6.1.1 Financial Regulation - Banking 
Canada’s banking system is based on branch banking by the “big 6” national banks. 
These institutions engage in commercial, retail, and investment banking as well as 
providing wealth management and mutual funds.
333
 The small number of large banks in 
Canada helps facilitate government intervention and coordination with the banking sector 
as a whole. The government maintains an “implicit guarantee” of banks, while also 
claiming the right to intervene to force mergers between strong and failing banks.
334
 It 
has been suggested that this governmental under-writing of the financial sector can allow 
technically insolvent banks to stay afloat in times of crisis, maintaining stock prices far 
higher than the market value of their assets alone would justify.
335
  
Gradual deregulation from the 1960’s through the 1980’s consolidated universal banking 
in Canada, allowing single banks to operate commercial and investment banking, as well 
as insurance and securities brokerage services.
336
 Thus, Canadian banks were already 
‘universal’ long before the American repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, which 
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allowed commercial-investment banks, securities dealers, and insurance brokerages to 
formally merge.
337
 The primary difference between the institutional structures of 
Canadian and American financial regulation is thus not the type of activities financial 
firms are allowed to undertake, but the centrality of regulatory authority which oversees 
them. Regional and National banks only emerged in the US in the 1980’s, by which time 
Canadian banks were already operating within an oligopolistic cartel structure.  
In fact before the 1980’s Canadian banks were typically more highly leveraged than 
American banks. However Canadian firms were able to fund assets through their large 
and stable deposit base rather than more skittish money markets as seen in the United 
States.
338
 Canadian banks thus lent more as a proportion of assets than American banks 
until the 1980’s. The low risk of failure, thanks to the implicit government guarantee, 
combined with higher returns on equity through increased leverage, allowed Canadian 
banks to be bolder than their American counterparts during this period.
339
 However this 
occurred under the aegis of centralized federal regulation and oversight, with the clear 
acknowledgement of government supervision and authority to intervene in the event of 
crisis. This combination of higher profits and greater stability mitigated competition in 
the Canadian financial industry – firms became more interested in long-term growth and 
maintenance than short-term survival. This in turn is argued to have “led to conservative 
banking and regulatory cultures.”
340
 
Conservative banking as a result of reduced risk may seem counter-intuitive, however 
this outcome occurred in Canada because banks traded stability for more rigid 
governmental supervision. American financial regulation is fragmented into numerous 
state and federal regulators, which are further divided according to the type of operation 
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in question (securities, insurance, etc.). Even the Federal Reserve is broken into twelve 
privately-owned regional banks.
341
 This worked well enough before the 1980’s, when the 
US banking sector was divided into thousands of smaller banks with no extensive 
national branch banking networks.
342
 However the deregulation of the 1980’s-90’s, 
culminating in the repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999, created a newly nationwide banking 
sector with nothing like comprehensive regulatory oversight.  
Since the 1980’s rules governing capital adequacy for financial institutions have been 
outlined in the internationally-recognized Basel Accord. Current standards are outlined 
under “Basel II”, although the amendments proposed in 2010 (“Basel III”) would raise 
capital requirements.
343
 Canada, the United States and the European Union all subscribe 
to Basel II, but Canadian domestic capital requirements are in fact more strict than those 
formally required under the treaty. Neither Canada nor the US allows an official risk-
weighted capital-to-assets greater than 20:1. Crucially though, American regulations do 
not include off-balance sheet activities in this calculation.
344
 Canada’s regulatory 
framework thus directly mitigated the increase of leverage, through off-balance sheet 
activity, which so destabilized American and European commercial banks in the recent 
crisis.  
6.1.2 Financial Regulation – Securities 
Equity, bond, and derivatives trading by financial firms requires transparency, through 
standardized accounting and external auditing, in order to prevent unfair market 
manipulation by those with inside knowledge. Until the 1990’s, the regulation of 
financial products in Canada increasingly converged with that of the United States. 
During this period, Canada’s Accounting Standards Board (ASB) brought regulations 
into line the United States’ Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). This was 
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motivated both by bilateral trade purposes as well as the increasingly accepted nature of 
GAAP globally.
345
 This trend of American financial accounting dominance was 
interrupted in 2002 when the European Union adopted the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) used by the International Accounting Standards Board based 
in London, UK.
346
  
In 2005 the ASB announced a shift in focus from GAAP to IFRS conformity, since the 
American Securities and Exchange Commission allows foreign companies to report 
under these rules. In fact, even American companies will be allowed to report to the SEC 
using IFRS by 2014.
347
 North American and European regulatory governance is thus 
converging in the realm of accounting standards, which are a vital basis for external 
auditing and ultimately micro- and macro-prudential oversight. This forms the 
informational basis for effective international coordination and oversight in these areas. 
However, the institutional authority and cooperation required for prudential oversight at 
the international level has not yet manifested itself to the degree seen in accounting 
standards.  
While international accounting standards can help improve transparency by mitigating 
arbitrage, it should be noted that mere standardization is not a panacea. Practices such as 
“mark-to-market” accounting, which value securities according to their current market 
value rather than the solvency of underlying assets, are still allowed under both GAAP 
and IFRS.
348
 ‘Transparency’ in securities’ regulation can thus have different meanings – 
transparency according to current market values gives investors clear information on the 
likely short-term performance of assets. This contributes to procyclicality as assets are 
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overvalued during bubble growth, and then collapse in value during contraction – “even 
in cases where the underlying assets were secure and at a zero risk of default.”
349
 
Accounting standards are a vital aspect of transparency in securities regulation and thus 
of macro-prudential oversight, however institutional authority is required to execute 
effective governance using available information at the national as well as international 
level.  
Canada does not have a national securities regulator, relying instead on securities 
regulation at the provincial level. The influence over financial stability of “near banks” – 
hedge funds, private capital funds, and trusts – in Canada is less than in the United States, 
due to the overwhelming concentration of financial assets in Canada’s six largest banks. 
However these “near banks” can still amplify instability in the case of a liquidity crisis as 
they require continuous short-term financing, while they do not have the deep pools of 
capital and liquidity maintained by federally regulated banks. During the financial crisis, 
many of these non-banks could not afford to repurchase assets which had been 
securitized but could no longer be refinanced. This resulted in “a $32 billion problem that 
left investors with substantial losses.”
350
 It has thus been argued that these institutions 
require a federal regulatory framework similar to that which governs formal banks. Such 
a framework would include capital and liquidity requirements as well as inspection, 
micro-prudential oversight, and a liquidity provider of last resort.  
6.1.3 Financial Regulation – Macro-prudential 
oversight 
Since the 1980’s the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) has 
been Canada’s main overseer of micro-prudential regulation. Micro-prudential oversight 
refers to the regulation of individual financial firms to maintain best practices and protect 
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depositors, as opposed to macro-prudential governance which seeks to balance systemic 
risk in the financial system as a whole.
351
 OSFI confers with the Bank of Canada, Canada 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC), the Department of Finance, and the Financial 
Consumer Agency of Canada through the Financial Institution Supervisory Committee. 
FISC does not regularly include provincial securities regulators or the Canadian 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation, rendering it ill-suited to coordinating policy 
regarding overall financial stability.
352
 FISC does however also convene, occasionally 
alongside provincial securities regulators and CMHC, under the Senior Advisory 
Committee, which is chaired by the deputy finance minister. Were financial stability to 
be formally articulated in SAC’s mandate, as well as those of its members, this could 
form the foundation for even more effective macro-prudential oversight at the national 
level.
353
  
While Canada fared better in the recent crisis than the United States and United 
Kingdom, this also indicates that any excessive systemic financial sector risk might 
remain as-yet obscured. The danger of this only increases as ‘hot money’ seeks a safe 
haven in Canada’s adulated financial sector, especially the booming Canadian real estate 
market. An apt analogy might be the passengers on a sinking ship attempting to rush into 
a single lifeboat, with the risk of overturning the lifeboat itself. As such, the role of 
macro-prudential oversight is of vital importance not only for recovering economies but 
also for countries, like Canada, seeking to avoid a repeat of the crisis.  
6.2 Housing and Financial Asset Bubble 
It might be presumed that Canada’s broad and deep economic integration with the United 
States would make the country more susceptible than others to the bursting of the US 
housing bubble. However, significant differences in mortgage market governance have 
helped Canada avoid the exposure to mortgage-backed securities seen in the US, UK, and 
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Iceland. Unlike in the US, mortgage interest payments in Canada are not tax-
deductible.
354
 Canadian mortgage-holders are also required to repay the full amount of 
their mortgage even in foreclosure, and this “full recourse” is enforceable through asset 
seizure or wage garnishing. This factor alone has been argued to reduce the rate of 
delinquency even as Canadian house prices decline.
355
  
Roughly 70% of Canadian mortgages are funded through deposits by large deposit-taking 
institutions. Mortgage loans representing more than 80% of the property’s value are 
required by law to be insured. Privately insured loans receive a 90% guarantee by the 
Canadian government, while loans insured with the Canadian Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation (CMHC) have a full government guarantee, and are thus considered ‘risk-
free’ for purposes of securitization.
356
 Securitization of CMHC-guaranteed mortgages 
began in 1987 through the National Housing Act Mortgage Backed-Securities program. 
CMHC also operates the Canada Housing Trust, which issues Canada Mortgage Bonds 
and uses the proceeds to purchase NHA-MBS’s.
357
 Canada thus has in place institutions 
similar to the American FNMA (Fannie) and FHLMC (Freddie), except that they are 
fully owned and explicitly guaranteed by the Canadian government. 
Canada’s mortgage market is dominated by the CMHC, a crown corporation wholly 
owned by the Canadian government and which is a direct conduit for government 
housing policy. The CMHC is operated on a commercial basis with the expectation of 
being self-funding through competitive default coverage on an actuarial basis. It is thus a 
crown corporation operated as a for-profit business. Like other insurers, the CMHC is 
required to pay any shortfall between foreclosure sale proceeds and the full value of an 
insured loan. CMHC represents about 70% of the Canadian mortgage insurance market, 
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insuring about half of outstanding mortgage debt in Canada.
358
 Until recently CMHC 
reported to Parliament under the supervision of the Minister of Human resources. Unlike 
private mortgage insurers, CMHC was not supervised by the Office of the Superintendent 
of Financial Institutions (OSFI), Canada’s financial regulatory authority. It nevertheless 
sets a target of twice the OSFI minimum capital requirements, and at last report was 
above this target.
359
  
In April, 2012 the federal government tabled legislation to bring CMHC under OFSI 
supervision.
360
 This is part of a broader government effort to cool Canada’s booming 
housing market, which many argue is in danger of generating a debt-fuelled asset bubble 
if it has not already done so.
361
 With the ratio of average home price to income in Canada 
is well above the historic average and household debt averaging over 150% of disposable 
income, OSFI also plans to tighten mortgage underwriting criteria for banks.
362
 All of 
these details, however, describe a financial system which sees close coordination between 
public and private institutions. The guarantee of housing is an explicit liability of the 
Canadian government, and mortgage issuance and securitization has thus been much 
more strictly regulated in Canada than elsewhere. Moreover, the concentration of 
Canadian financial firms and their relatively conservative business practices have resulted 
in much less penetration of Canadian financial markets by subprime mortgages and over-
the-counter (shadow banking) securities. Canada’s financial sector and regulatory 
framework thus favour long-term stability and growth over competition and financial 
innovation. It also imposes more comprehensive and active government oversight of 
financial institutions in recognition of their systemic importance, in exchange for the 
right to operate as an essentially oligopolistic cartel. 
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6.3 Financial Crisis 
Canada did experience a financial crisis along with other developed countries. 
Confidence in Canadian banks’ solvency, as implied by lending rates and Credit Default 
Swap prices, did show a marked increase along with their foreign counterparts. However, 
Canadian banks did not suffer from the liquidity shortages afflicting American and 
European financial institutions through late-2007 and early-2008.
363
 No Canadian bank 
failed during the financial crisis, nor was there the flood of mortgage defaults as seen in 
the United States. Interbank lending rates in Canada did increase alongside those in the 
US and Europe, but to a far lesser extent.
364
 Canadian banks also did not exhibit the 
degree of liquidity hoarding observable in other banks starting with the announcement of 
losses at BNP Paribas in early August 2007.
365
 While some hoarding occurred in the 
period directly following Lehman’s collapse in September 2008, Canadian banks 
returned to pre-crisis lending and borrowing patterns after December, 2008.
366
  
Canadian banks made relatively conservative use of liquidity auctions, especially 
compared to European banks, offered by the Central Bank from late-2007 and early-
2008. Moreover, Canadian banks only made limited use of the “bailout” government 
purchase of MBS after January, 2009, when American and European banks were still 
scrambling for liquidity.
367
 This relatively conservative liquidity-seeking behaviour 
indicates “that participants did not believe there were significant liquidity or counterparty 
risks.”
368
 The crisis of confidence in the general financial sector which served as such a 
driver – and amplifier – of the financial crisis elsewhere was thus largely absent in 
Canada. 
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6.4 Financial Intervention 
It is not strictly speaking true that “the Canadian government did not bail out its banks,” 
however the execution of these “bailout” loans was both more conservative and more 
concerted than the haphazard process seen in the US and Europe. During the global 
financial crisis the Canadian government approved the Insured Mortgage Purchase 
Program (IMPP), a scheme to loan CMHC the money to finance up to $125 billion in 
NHA-MBS from Canadian banks.
369
 The Canadian government funded this loan by 
issuing debt instruments such as bonds, increasing the total outstanding government debt 
on such instruments by about 30%, to about $520 billion. However, the interest on these 
instruments constituted the minimum bid yield in actual IMPP auctions.
370
 This means 
that the program will be revenue-neutral in the long-term and should in fact produce 
revenue as many bids were over the minimum yield.
371
 
Initially set at $25 billion in October, 2008, the program expanded along with the crisis, 
reaching $75 billion in November. The 2009 budget finally increased the available credit 
to $125 billion.
372
 This allowed banks to increase the proportion of liquid assets on their 
balance sheets by offloading hard-to-sell MBS. However, unlike the American bank 
bailouts under TARP, the assets purchased by CMHC were all already insured either 
privately or through CMHC and thus guaranteed by the government. The American 
policy response was first to inject capital into insolvent institutions, then to buy those 
institutions highest-risk, and therefore least valuable, assets. The Canadian response 
provided banks with liquidity in exchange for their lowest-risk assets: mortgages already 
guaranteed against default by the government.
373
 The Canadian government was thus 
able to provide banks with greater liquidity to see them through the crisis without adding 
‘toxic assets’ onto its balance sheet.  
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The efficacy of IMPP in easing banks’ liquidity constraints in order to facilitate lending 
and stimulate the economy is difficult to directly gauge. In Q4 2008, household credit 
extended by banks increased by just over $50 billion, twice what the CMHC purchased in 
that period.
374
 Bank lending in Canada never experienced the panicked contraction it saw 
in the US and elsewhere, and the IMPP reinforced this confidence in liquidity access on 
the part of financial institutions.  
6.5 Monetary Policy Response 
The Bank of Canada responded with standard liquidity injections in the second half of 
2007. By the end of 2007 Canada joined the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, Swiss 
Bank, and the European Central Bank in introducing term auction facilities (bidding on 
short-term loans) to increase liquidity.
375
 These facilities were allowed to expire as 
markets calmed after December, 2007 but were reintroduced in March, 2008 in response 
to the collapse of Bear Stearns.
376
 It bears noting that Canada’s term Purchase and Resale 
Agreement (term PRA) facility was slightly different from its American counterpart in 
the Fed’s Term Auction Facility (TAF).  Term PRA auctions required winning 
participants to pay the interest rate at which they bid, whereas TAF participants had only 
to pay the lowest accepted rate at auction regardless of their initial bid.
377
 This made 
Canadian liquidity facilities more conservative and less generous to banks than their 
American counterparts. 
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, interbank lending rates in 
Canada jumped upward as global credit evaporated and the Bank of Canada took on a 
more important role as a provider of short-term liquidity.
378
 As part of the G7 action 
plan, term auctions increased in value and frequency, peaking at 2% of the total value of 
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financial industry assets (compared to 7% in the US and 5% in the Eurozone).
379
 The 
expansion of acceptable collateral for government lending under IMPP also eased 
liquidity problems for institutions holding less-valued, but nevertheless low-risk, MBS 
assets.
380
 However, unlike elsewhere this period of extreme risk-aversion did not last 
beyond 2008.
381
 Canadian interbank markets had largely calmed by April, 2009, when 
the Bank of Canada lowered the prime interest rate to the effective lower bound and 
pledged to maintain that level for one year. Throughout 2009 Canadian funding markets 
continued to improve, term PRA operations shrank in size, term, and issue frequency 
until they were phased out starting in April 2010.
382
  
Researchers have found “robust evidence” that announcements of term PRA facilities 
contributed to lowering liquidity premiums for Canadian banks, encouraging lending by 
reinforcing confidence in short-term funding markets.
383
 The role of monetary policy in 
moderating economic cycles is well founded in Canada. Canada was the second country 
to implement a formal inflation target in 1991, and the Bank of Canada has employed 
monetary policy since that time to keep the interest rate very near its stated goal of 2%. 
Emphasizing the evolution of monetary policy as a response to economic disruptions, 
Christopher Ragan argues that this expansion of the Bank of Canada’s role “would not 
have happened without the shocks and policy mistakes and learning that occurred over 
the previous 30 years.”
384
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6.6 Fiscal Policy Response 
As a compliment to expansive monetary policy, and the IMPP designed to shore up the 
financial system, the Canadian government also embarked on an ambitious fiscal 
stimulus program. Canada’s Economic Action Plan provided $47.2 billion in areas 
including: construction and home building incentives; transportation infrastructure, and; 
lowering corporate and individual taxes.
385
 Initiatives included personal income tax relief 
and infrastructural projects, many of which have been undertaken in partnership with the 
provinces. The government earmarked $14 billion in corporate tax incentives and 
subsidies, and of this $9.7 billion was used to bail out the automotive industry. Initiatives 
by provincial governments added over $14 billion to the total government stimulus 
spending in Canada.
386
  
The government claimed credit for the upswing in economic growth in the second half of 
2009, following three consecutive quarters of negative growth. However, a study by the 
Fraser Institute published in 2010 attributed less than 10% of the increase in growth to 
the stimulus program, instead crediting business investment and net exports.
387
 This 
report itself came under fire from industry leaders such as the Construction Sector 
Council. They disagreed, arguing that the study was flawed in its conclusion that fiscal 
stimulus was ineffective because it ignored the 2-3 year time horizons for rolling out 
major projects. The study was also criticized for ignoring the less-quantifiable effect 
stimulus spending - especially infrastructural spending – has on business confidence in 
the private sector.
388
 The report also overlooked the effect of stimulus in maintaining 
lower unemployment in the recession-prone construction industry, which results in lower 
spending on automatic stabilizers such as employment insurance.
389
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With Canadian growth slowing in response to prolonged weak global demand in the 
United States, Europe, and Asia, the impulse may arise for additional fiscal stimulus. 
However even those on the left have argued that additional stimulus would add little to 
the economic benefits presently derived from easy monetary policy and the ample 
liquidity in the financial system. It has been pointed out that stimulating home ownership 
would if anything be counterproductive, given the currently expanding housing asset 
bubble and over-indebted household balance sheets.
390
 Currently high levels of unused 
production capacity in light of uncertain future demand mean that investment stimulus 
would also result in little additional output. Companies are already sitting on unused plant 
and liquid capital which they hesitate to employ, they do not require more from the 
government. Finally, tax cuts have been argued to be an inappropriate means of short-
term economic stabilization due to the long time horizons required to realize their 
stimulative economic effects.
391
  
While those on the left and right disagree regarding the effect of government stimulus 
along ideological grounds, and neither would advocate its further extension, it is probably 
safe to say that the stimulus program had at most a modest effect on Canadian growth. 
However, the American experience demonstrates that even massive stimulus spending 
will not generate wide scale economic recovery in the absence of more broad-based 
credit availability and business confidence. In this regard, the government’s effective 
monetary policy response, and especially the perception of stability of Canadian banks 
throughout the crisis, can be credited with the return to economic growth much more than 
can Fiscal Stimulus. 
6.7 Economic Recovery 
Gordon Isfeld puts the causes of Canada’s relatively strong performance through the 
crisis and recession succinctly, crediting “a timely macro-economic policy response and a 
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solid banking sector.”
392
 Canadian policies correlate to markedly better economic 
performance than other developed countries following the restoration of market 
confidence by 2010. All major Canadian industries except utilities posted gains in 2010. 
Manufacturing, wholesale trade, and minerals extraction all grew at or just over 5% in 
2010 while retail, transportation, and the financial sector also grew as a result of these 
primary activities.
393
 Spillovers from the drop in global demand kept exports steady at 
just under 30% of nominal GDP, from a pre-recession level of 35%.
394
 Excluding 
housing, business investment continued to lag and was dominated by construction of 
energy infrastructure. Construction was the strongest contributor to GDP growth in 2010 
at 8.1%, reflecting Canada’s booming real estate market. Indeed, by 2011 the share of 
GDP represented by residential construction has scarcely fallen from its 2007 peak.
395
 
The heavy role of construction in Canada’s economic recovery carries inherent risks 
however, as outlined in the section on Canada’s housing bubble above.  
Canada benefited from a sound financial system and prompt government policy response 
in the financial crisis and recession of 2007-2009. The national savings rate was 13.8% 
heading into the recession, compared to less than 1% in the US.
396
 Its economic growth 
has continued at relatively high levels compared to other developed economies thanks to 
capital flight into Canada’s ‘safe’ financial sector, continuing high commodity prices, and 
the acceleration of debt-driven consumption by the public and subsequently private 
sectors. However, these factors complicate Canada’s position moving forward. The 
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government is wisely trying to curb excessive financial speculation, especially in the 
overheated housing market.
397
  
Canada entered a trade deficit in late 2008, as commodity prices increased while demand 
for manufactures like automobiles dropped worldwide. The deficit widened in both 2009 
and 2010, reflecting a faster recovery in domestic spending than in other developed 
economies. As government spending subsided, domestic demand was supported by 
increased household borrowing.
398
 Here again, economic growth masks the increasingly 
leveraged nature of the Canadian economy. Canada’s economy is deeply dependent on 
exports, which represent almost 30% of GDP. However, exports averaged over 38% of 
GDP from 2001-2007. That is a higher proportion than any other case study in this paper, 
although the proportion of exports in the UK (30.1%) and Icelandic (56%) economies 
have since surpassed Canada’s.
399
 The financial turmoil in other developed economies 
has also hurt Canadian exports through currency appreciation, as Canada loses ground in 
the American market to lower-cost exporters such as China and Mexico.
400
  
Canada is the only economy considered in this paper to have been running a consistent 
trade surplus at the onset of the crisis financial. By 2007, Canada had run a trade surplus 
every year since 1999. With the exception of Iceland from 1993-1995, no other economy 
in this paper posted a trade surplus in any year from 1991-2011.
401
 The lower reliance on 
debt for economic growth in Canada improved its ability to deal with a credit crisis 
compared to the other economies outlined in this paper. Canada may have had more 
flexibility in maintaining conservative lending practices due to the availability of non-
debt capital resulting from the trade surplus. Canada’s continued economic growth since 
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the crisis has been largely debt-fuelled as a result of dropping global demand, especially 
among resource-importing Asian economies such as China.
402
  
The credit-fuelled global economic boom of the early-2000’s, especially in commodities, 
fuelled Canada’s trade surplus from 1999-2007, providing the fiscal stability to withstand 
the financial crisis. This subjects Canada’s growth to the risk of continuing subdued 
demand as the recession moves down through the global supply chain – initially striking 
consumer economies in Europe and the US, then transmitting through demand spillovers 
to the manufacturing economies of Asia. The European sovereign debt crisis, combined 
with high commodity prices, has prolonged the recession in Europe while dampening 
American and Asian market confidence and growth.
403
 Should this trend continue, 
Canada will experience a similarly slow recovery, which until now has been avoided by 
1) the flexibility in policy response capacity due to Canada’s sound finances going into 
the credit crisis, and; 2) the time lag inherent in demand spillovers due to Canada’s 
position within global supply chains.   
The danger is that another market collapse with global ramifications, as seems plausible 
if not yet probable in Europe, will find Canada much more indebted than it was in 2007. 
This would reduce the capacity for monetary and fiscal stimulus, as well as the capacity 
for households to temporarily fund consumption through debt. Canada would then find 
itself in a position similar to those of the US and UK in 2007-2009, with credit 
availability and economic growth dragging each other down in a self-reinforcing manner. 
In the absence of global economic recovery, Canada can only sustain growth through 
debt for so long, regardless of the strength and values of its financial system. This 
illustrates the deeply integrated nature of the global economy. Given that the global 
recession was initiated by the financial imbalances and malfeasance illustrated so far in 
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this paper, the logical conclusion is that financial governance on a global scale is crucial 
in preventing such a crisis in the future. 
It is clear that the conditions underlying Canada’s strong position moving into the crisis 
are not entirely endogenous or suggestive of a general ‘Canadian superiority.’ A degree 
of luck in the timing of the crisis, and Canada’s resource-driven economy, played a role 
in Canada’s ability to withstand the crisis. Nevertheless, the Canadian case demonstrates 
the value of all four policy variables examined in this paper. Timely financial 
interventions provided liquidity during the worst phases of the financial crisis, though no 
banks faced immediate failure requiring forced mergers or nationalization. Monetary and 
fiscal stimulus supported demand and contributed to a more prompt resumption of 
growth. Finally, sound financial governance comprising countercyclical capital 
accumulation by banks and a long history of public-private regulatory coordination 
encouraged informational transparency in evaluating risk. This was amplified by the fact 
that most financial activity in Canada falls within the regulated banking sector under one 
of the six main banks, reducing exposure to either the American or domestic subprime 
MBS markets. Canadian banks have been “too big to fail” for decades, but regulatory 
coordination and strong corporate governance have prevented any from doing so in that 
time. 
7 Summing Up 
The financial crisis prompted aggressive government response in four main areas. First 
was an increase in short-term liquidity through the lowering of interest rates, as 
exemplified by the lowering of the US prime lending rate by the Fed from 5.25% in 
September 2007 to .25% by September 2008.
404
 However credit has become much more 
expensive despite this easing, and households and businesses still face tightened credit 
standards which has led some to argue that monetary policy is ineffective in containing a 
crisis of this scale.
405
 The second main government response has been to recapitalize 
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systemically important, or “too big to fail,” banks as “quasi-public institutions.”406 The 
third response has been a general fiscal expansion, much more so in the United States 
than in Europe, to further stimulate the economy once interest rates neared 0%.
407
 The 
fourth, most long-term and as-yet little realized response has been that of domestic and 
international financial reregulation.  
Shortcomings in policy response have generally been in slow acknowledgment and 
engagement of the (admittedly rapidly escalating) problems, for instance the US 
governments’ allowing Lehman Brothers to fail in 2008 and ad hoc approach to TARP, 
which sparked the initial global panic. Other examples include the muted pace of 
monetary and fiscal stimulus in Europe as compared to the US and China, which has 
contributed to the European sovereign debt crisis, and the halting momentum of financial 
reregulation in the US compared to Europe.
408
 Market analysis has demonstrated three 
trends in the effects of governments’ responses to the crisis. One is that comprehensive, 
economy-wide policies are necessary and that “policy actions that are perceived to be ad 
hoc or targeted at individual systemic institutions tend to exacerbate market fears...”409 
The second main finding is that a coordinated response among states is crucial, and that 
foreign policy responses strongly affected domestic interbank markets in affected 
economies as “international spillovers of policy announcements intensified as the crisis 
deepened.”410 Finally, while macroeconomic monetary and fiscal policy response by 
governments filled short-term liquidity gaps, they did not ameliorate the general lack of 
trust fuelling market volatility.  
While helpful in mitigating the depths of the ensuing recession, no government actions 
could have been realistically expected to prevent the global financial crisis once it began 
to unfold. Moreover, policy responses of the type described can only be maintained in the 
short-term, as the state institutions which were responsible for preventing a recession 
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from becoming a depression have become highly indebted in the process, so that 
“continued fiscal expansion faces limits and poses dangers.”411 The only effective remedy 
for a systemic financial crisis of the scale recently seen is thus prevention through 
prudent financial governance, the basis of which is effective financial regulation. 
7.1 Financial Regulation, Deregulation, 
and Oversight 
Three problems with current regulation have been consistently pointed out. First, most 
national regulatory frameworks focus primarily on micro-prudential governance – 
limiting the risk exposure of individual firms without considering aggregate risk in the 
broader financial system. For example, SIV’s were not subject to risk-based capital 
charges under Basel II. This form of arbitrage allowed institutions to engage in what was 
considered a low-risk activity at the individual level, but which destabilized the entire 
system when undertaken simultaneously by many – especially dominant - firms.
412
 This 
process is prevalent in the US, UK, and Iceland cases. While Greek debt did not balloon 
due to financial innovation, the misrepresentation of government debt until 2009 
correlates to the misleading balance sheets of private financial institutions elsewhere. 
Second, low inflation and economic stability through the 1990’s and early 2000’s 
affected statistical risk measures, leading to the underestimation of risk premiums, 
excessive risk taking, and eventually asset price bubbles. Finally, regulators have often 
failed to enforce existing regulations.
413
 This is visible in the US, UK, and Iceland cases 
in the form of lax regulatory governance by national governments and central banks, and 
in the case of Greece through insufficient oversight by Eurozone governance bodies 
including the European Central Bank.  
The deregulation of banking in the United States from 1980 to 2004 allowed the massive 
increase in systemic risk, via opaque financial products which obscured counterparty risk. 
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This created a more fragile network of debt obligations while mergers and consolidation 
– also allowed by deregulation – simultaneously created firms which were too 
systemically important to be allowed to fail. In the European case, monetary integration 
made even small economies like Greece “too big to fail,” while denying them the 
monetary and fiscal autonomy to mitigate economic shocks. The concurrent allowance of 
riskier practices under Basel II extended this process worldwide, as increasing leverage 
allowed debt-financed mergers and takeovers in Europe as well. Iceland and the UK thus 
also saw financial firms’ balance sheets grow enormously. Easy credit also translated into 
lower borrowing costs not just for banks, but also for national governments such as 
Greece. 
7.2 Financial Interventions 
Financial interventions and bailouts have been necessary to mitigate the financial 
collapse in all cases examined in this paper. The US and UK saw the recapitalization, 
nationalization, or forced merger of several large and systemically important financial 
institutions. Iceland faced financial collapses of such magnitude that state intervention 
was not an option. Even Canada took measures to inject liquidity into banks in exchange 
for illiquid, yet stable, assets. Iceland’s default on its foreign debt has not so far resulted 
in the threatened exclusion from international lending. However firms and governments 
in systemically important countries do not have this luxury, due to the global havoc such 
defaults would unleash. It is thus apparent that, like financial institutions, some countries 
are ‘too big to fail,’ while others are not. 
7.3 Transmission of the Crisis 
The transmission of the crisis was a direct result of global financial integration, 
specifically the international cross-holding of debt among financial firms. Research has 
shown that such financial integration “produces a significant increase in net debt for the 
96 
 
most financially developed [countries].”
414
 Moderate shocks to firm equity in these areas 
can trigger systemic asset price corrections. This process of contagion is seen in the way 
the US crisis spread almost instantly around the world, including to the UK, Canada, and 
Iceland. It also applies to Greece in the sense that national debt experienced a price 
correction as investors’ risk appetite shrank and demand plummeted.  
7.4 Monetary Policy Response 
The financial crisis and recession prompted unprecedented expansion in monetary policy 
in the US, UK, and Canada. In all cases this eased pressure on banks’ balance sheets, 
which allowed them to borrow from the government at lower rates, but did not on its own 
trigger resumption of normal lending by banks. Monetary expansion thus helped mitigate 
the financial crisis, and thus indirectly lessened spillovers into the real economy by 
stabilizing the financial sector. However, monetary expansion did not stimulate the 
resumption of normal economic activity, through increased investment, as is assumed by 
Keynesian theory. Iceland, the only country to allow all systemically important banks to 
fail, has since lowered interest rates and in fact resumed economic growth. This suggests 
that the Keynesian prescription for monetary expansion is useful in stimulating economic 
growth, in the absence of liquidity hoarding and severe debt burdens within the financial 
sector. Greece was unable to undertake monetary expansion due to its Eurozone currency 
membership, and in contrast to Iceland has suffered continued economic contraction. 
This reinforces the link between monetary stimulus and the resumption of growth in 
recession. 
7.5 Fiscal Policy Response 
Keynesian economic theory prescribes government spending to stimulate domestic 
demand and mitigate contractions in economic activity. In the cases in this paper, fiscal 
expansion to combat the recession was generally circumscribed by the marketability of 
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government debt, with the exception of the UK. The American and Canadian cases 
provide the strongest examples of fiscal stimulus. The governments of these countries 
were able to undertake this due to the availability of borrowing (continued demand for 
government bond issues), as well as sound public finances following years of budget 
surpluses and debt repayment in the case of Canada.  
The UK could arguably have undertaken stimulus as well, however the political exigency 
of the 2010 general election which resulted in a Conservative-led coalition government. 
Iceland was unable to engage in fiscal expansion due to the collapse of revenues 
following the economic contraction and the cost of recapitalizing the Central Bank. 
Subsequent Icelandic economic growth has instead stemmed from currency devaluation 
and strong international demand for natural resources. Greece has been prevented from 
pursuing fiscal stimulus as spending cuts are a condition of its continued rescue loans. 
The more pronounced resumption of economic growth in Canada and the US as 
compared to Greece and the UK thus support the Keynesian prescription of deficit 
spending (if available) through fiscal stimulus. Iceland’s fate remains to be seen, and 
further growth will depend upon the continuation of international commodity demand 
and the effects of planned spending cuts which have yet to be enacted. 
Table 1 Policy Variables and Findings 
 
Variable 
United 
States Iceland 
United 
Kingdom Greece Canada 
Fiscal Stimulus yes no no no yes 
Monetary Stimulus yes no yes no yes 
Financial 
Interventions/Bailouts yes no yes no yes 
Financial Governance weak very weak moderate n/a strong 
Informational Transparency weak very weak weak very weak strong 
shadow banking exposure high high high n/a low 
Severity of Financial Crisis high high high n/a low 
commodity/export 
dependence low high low low high 
Economic Recovery weak, slow 
moderate, 
slow weak, slow ongoing crisis strong, rapid 
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8 Conclusions 
8.1 Global Financial Governance 
Financial stability in a globalized world necessarily involves international coordination. 
The experience of the Great Depression and Second World War led to the creation of the 
international Bretton Woods institutions, which coordinated and promoted free trade, 
financial stability and development.
415
 Following the Asian financial crisis the IMF, if 
weakly, reiterated the lessons of the Great Depression by characterizing global financial 
stability as a “global public good.”416 In the absence of a global government to provide 
such a public good, the G20 has emerged as a global governance forum representing over 
85% of world population and 66% of global GDP. Yet despite this and other coordinating 
bodies such as the Bretton Woods institutions and the newly-created Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), “there is no effective international mechanism” to ensure compliance with 
internationally-agreed upon recommendations at the national level.
417
 
Central Banks participate in the Bank for International Settlements’ Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision. The Basel committee creates policy recommendations, new 
versions of which were recently accepted by the G20. Regulations must be 
institutionalised at the national level, under the oversight of the Financial Stability Board. 
Due to the consensual basis of international relations and governance, the effectiveness of 
fora such as the FSB and Basel committee require “the authority and the political will” to 
implement policies. Canada, the United States and the European Union all subscribe to 
Basel II, although Canadian domestic capital requirements are more strict than formally 
required under the treaty.  
Canadian rules prohibit an official risk-weighted capital-to-asset ratio greater than 20:1. 
Crucially though, American regulations do not include off-balance sheet activities in this 
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calculation.
418
 Canada’s regulatory framework thus directly mitigated the increase of 
leverage, through off-balance sheet activity, which so destabilized American and 
European commercial banks in the recent crisis. The Basel III reform proposals follow 
“in Canada’s footsteps” by raising capital adequacy requirements for banks.
419
 Basel III 
was actually developed as a response to the global financial crisis, with the intention of 
increasing prudence in liquidity management and bolstering counterparty confidence in 
case of crisis.
420
 However these reforms are still not as strict as Canadian domestic 
regulations regarding minimum capital-asset ratios, or in their definition of what qualifies 
as an ‘asset.’
421
  
8.2 Micro-prudential Solutions 
Firm-level regulation is not sufficient to prevent systemic risk, but can be used to 
discourage its origins. Moral hazard generated by “originate-to-distribute” requires 
“better aligning the interests of mortgage lenders and investors,” for instance requiring 
firms to hold onto part of their loans (as is the case in Canada) so that they face part of 
the risk they generate. Incentives for overzealous risk-taking by executives could be 
mitigated by compensation structures with longer time horizons.
422
 The extension of 
greater government intervention at the institutional (micro) and systemic (macro) levels 
faces political resistance from neoliberal free market advocates. These critics rightly 
point out the danger of moral hazard, stemming from public guarantees which encourage 
excessive risk-taking.
423
 The massive interventions required to stabilize the recent 
financial crisis are the result of exactly this type of moral hazard. Goddard et al. argue 
that “the system has been underwritten by a huge but previously implicit public subsidy,” 
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whereby banks exploited their systemic importance to expand their balance sheets 
“recklessly.”
424
  
Broadly speaking, five options exist for dealing with the problem of financial institutions 
which are systemically “too big to fail,” relating to the problem of moral hazard. The first 
option is to limit the size of financial institutions. The second is to set capital 
requirements which mitigate the likelihood of illiquidity and thus failure. Third, 
commercial and investment banking could be re-separated as they were under Glass-
Steagall. A fourth option is to standardize resolution regimes to permit effective and 
predictable regulatory intervention in failing banks. The final, and so far most popular, 
proposal is improved systemic risk monitoring and supervision, or macro-prudential 
oversight. These are all politically contentious, and none but the last have gained wide 
popularity due to their inherent government constraints on the private financial sector and 
the lack of “clear evidence that they would have helped to avoid the recent crisis.”
425
 If 
anything, regulators have most strongly favoured the last proposal because it implies they 
were constrained in their mandate, and thus failed to prevent the crisis due to 
shortcomings in policy rather than performance.
426
 
Limiting the size of institutions and separating commercial and investment banks may 
seem intuitively appropriate, however Canada has a large concentrated financial sector 
which has allowed universal banking for decades. Standardizing resolution regimes, as 
undertaken in the US and UK in response to the crisis, will help to mitigate extended 
market panic during a crisis but will do little to prevent the buildup of systemic risk. 
Enforced (and self-imposed) capital adequacy requirements and comprehensive 
regulatory oversight are the defining characteristics that set Canada’s financial system 
apart. Banks can be large and diversified, but only if they are transparent regarding their 
activities, degree of leverage, and thus vulnerability to asset depreciation, liquidity 
shocks, etc. The moral hazard implicit in ‘too-big-to-fail’ can only be addressed by the 
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explicit input of all stakeholders in corporate governance – including taxpayers. Kay goes 
so far as to argue that, “the banking system is part of the state... [it] holds a public 
monopoly on creating money i.e. the state allows private banks to say that their deposits 
are equivalent to real money backed by the [Central Bank].”
427
 
8.3 Macro-prudential solutions 
Ragan proposes two new roles of central governance in the interest of financial stability, 
“leaning” and “macro-prudential regulation.” Leaning against financial excesses
428
, is 
now much less controversial than it would have been during growth years. However, the 
problem remains that using interest rates to curb excesses will cause deviation from the 
inflation target – the interest rate instrument applies to the entire economy, and can cause 
unnecessary inflation if used to target imbalances in a specific narrow sector.
429
 Sector 
specific regulation is argued to be the best solution in this case, leaving Central Bank 
monetary instruments free to pursue price stability.
430
 Margin requirements (minimum 
down-payments and maximum amortization periods) for bubble-prone industries such as 
real estate have been advocated as a more appropriate tool for battling asset bubbles than 
economy-wide rises in interest rates and thus borrowing costs. Such tools were preferred 
by policymakers during the Keynesian heyday of the postwar period.
431
 However, by 
requiring minimum levels of creditworthiness from borrowers, margin controls do carry 
the drawback preventing low-income households from accessing credit to buy their first 
home and begin building equity capital.
432
 
“Macro-prudential” oversight arises from the need to oversee the financial system as a 
whole, rather than just individual institutions, and arises from the interconnectedness of 
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financial institutions.
433
 This includes assessing potential sources of financial shocks and 
anticipating potential spillovers and positive feedback loops. It is here argued that a 
generally countercyclical policy is required to counter “the procyclicality of credit and 
leverage that is a natural aspect of the economic cycle.”
434
 This is consistent with the 
Canadian experience – Canadian corporate, public, and household finances all exhibited 
the most countercyclical behaviour in the lead-up to the financial crisis. While this has 
partially to do with the good fortune of a commodity-fuelled trade surplus, conservative 
corporate governance and the pursuit of a balanced budget since before 1999 also played 
a significant role. 
8.3.1 The role of Regulation 
The immediate cause of the financial crisis in the US and other industrial countries was 
the bursting of the residential real estate price bubble. Regulators allowed the bubble to 
grow while overlooking the excessive financial and economic leveraging which would 
amplify the damage of the bubble bursting. Existing regulations could have reduced or 
prevented both conditions, mitigating systemic risk.
435
 Regulatory transparency and 
accountability is a prerequisite for any more effective regulation, including the recent 
proposals for regulatory reform by the Obama administration and the amendments to the 
international Basel accord under Basel III.
436
  
At the national level, expanding the role of government intervention in the economy, 
even (perhaps especially) for the purpose of macro-prudential regulation, is politically 
contentious. As Canova states, “it is uncertain whether Congress and the president can 
muster the political will to impose regulation on such private centres of wealth, privilege, 
and power, which cross national borders.”
437
 As a counterpoint to the philosophical 
arguments against government intervention in the economy, it can be argued that the 
level of government intervention required in the face of a major financial crisis as seen 
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recently suggests that “a better policy framework now might well permit ‘less’ 
government later.”
438
 
A Common theme in many analyses of the financial crisis is the procyclical nature of 
crises spread through financial contagion and counterparty risk. Much recent research has 
therefore concluded that a countercyclical prudential approach is needed to mitigate the 
amplitude of business cycle fluctuations, generating smaller booms and much less severe 
busts.
439
 Significantly, research has found that Canadian banks’ follow a countercyclical 
approach to capital buffers, building up reserves in periods of growth which can be drawn 
upon during economic contractions.
440
 Similar patterns are found in the German and 
Norwegian financial sectors, whose economies also weathered the financial crisis 
relatively well, while capital buffers have been found to be procyclical in other parts of 
Europe.
441
 This lends credence to the arguments of countercyclical prudential advocates, 
and it has been argued that such an approach should form the basis of the Basel III 
amendments, to “correct the [procyclical] deficiencies in Basel II that exacerbated the 
subprime crisis.”
442
   
While widely seen as a move in the right direction, mandating countercyclical capital 
buffers faces political barriers at the international and domestic levels. Internationally, 
consensus will be difficult concerning restricting banks’ growth among governments 
representing economies which are still in competition for capital and resources, despite 
growing global interdependence. Domestically, higher capital requirements will increase 
the cost of credit, “and while more regulation of banks has considerable appeal, more 
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costly credit does not.”
443
 The prioritization of financial stability will require a negotiated 
political compromise concerning “societal preferences for stability over growth.”
444
 
8.3.2 The Limits of Monetary Policy 
Schwarcz highlights that the role of the Fed as lender of last resort can fail to stabilize 
crises because so much contemporary corporate financing occurs directly through capital 
markets, rather than from banks and other financial intermediaries.
445
 He proposes a 
second government-sponsored “liquidity provider of last resort”, which could quickly 
purchase securities in order to stabilize irrationally panicked markets. Since these 
securities would be purchased at a discount, and the market for them subsequently 
stabilized, the costs of such a program would be lower than directly lending to troubled 
financial institutions.
446
 Such a program was in fact undertaken by the Canadian 
government, though on an ad-hoc basis, through the Insured Mortgage Purchase 
Program.
447
  
Since all troubled securities would presumably not already be guaranteed by the 
government, formalizing such an institution on a permanent basis would be unlikely to be 
cost-neutral. However, mitigating the severity of market panics – where investors act 
irrationally to the detriment of all – would offset instances where the purchase of troubled 
assets proved unprofitable to the liquidity-providing institution through the benefits of 
longer-term market stability. This would help mitigate the moral hazard implicit in 
relying on a lender of last resort, which encourages higher risk-taking and incurs 
substantial public losses if firms receiving emergency support fail regardless. A market 
liquidity-provider of last resort, however, “can profitably invest in securities at a deep 
discount from the market price and still provide a floor to how low the market will 
drop.”
448
 Such a framework would also provide the benefit of acting on a market-wide 
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level, rather than focusing on rescuing successive firms as a chain reaction of institutional 
defaults unfolds.
449
  
 
 
 
8.4 Conclusions for Canada 
 
Canada has taken a much more statist, Keynesian approach to macro-economic policy 
than the other cases in this paper. The Canadian government reduced deficits and paid 
down debt during the growth years of the early 2000’s, and was thus in a much better 
position to undertake monetary and fiscal stimulus when the crisis struck. Iceland ran a 
substantial surplus from 2004 to 2007, and was also on a debt-reduction path. However 
this was only possible due to the titanic financial bubble driving Iceland’s economy, with 
the crisis quickly driving deficits to over 10% of GDP and total debt back over 100%.
450
 
Canada thus combined countercyclical economic policy with a more state-centred 
approach to policy response. An example of this is the comparison between American 
and Canadian quantitative easing.  
 
Under TARP, the US government acquired huge amounts of toxic assets, while Canada’s 
IMPP added risk-free (or at least no added-risk), government guaranteed MBS’s to 
balance sheets at CMHC. American taxpayers bought banks’ least valuable assets, while 
Canadian banks received liquidity in exchange for only their least risky assets. However, 
the cost of supporting demand through debt has resulted in strained financial conditions 
for Canadian households and firms. Debt-to-income ratios in Canada are higher than in 
the now-deleveraged US and UK.
451
 Federal debt is still highly marketable as evidenced 
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by Canadian bond yields.
452
 However, total government debt is now over 80% of GDP if 
provincial and intra-governmental debt is taken into account.
453
  
 
 
Figure 3 Net Surplus/Deficit (%GDP) 
 
 
Figure 4 Central Government Debt (%GDP) 
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Canadian household finances, especially mortgage and other debt servicing, are now 
highly vulnerable to fluctuations in the labour and housing markets.
454
 The stability of 
financial firms is dependent upon the ability to repay of the businesses and households 
they lend to, and so Canada’s entire financial system is thus now much more exposed to 
exogenous shocks than it was pre-crisis. Canada’s sound position going into the crisis and 
its concerted policy response helped avoid a domestic financial crisis by addressing the 
liquidity shortage and, crucially, by reassuring investor confidence in the solvency of 
Canadian banks. This in turn has helped mitigate domestic spillovers from the global 
economic downturn. However, global economic recovery remains impeded by the 
European sovereign debt crisis, American deficit fears, and the slowdown of growth and 
continued savings and exchange rate imbalances in Asia’s emerging economies.
455
  
No single national economy can completely shield itself from global macroeconomic 
fluctuations, and Canada’s financial buffer has been largely depleted by the recent crisis. 
The context for national economic governance and policymaking is now global. The last 
three decades of economic and financial integration mean that shocks, especially in the 
centres of economic and financial gravity in the US and Europe, have spillover effects for 
the entire world and can be self-reinforcing.
456
 Such crises are also procyclical, 
reinforcing their own effects when originating in systemically important financial 
institutions in the US and Europe.  
Canada’s case shows that effective governance and prevention are the only true remedies 
for softening economic shocks, supporting a Keynesian policy paradigm in the sense that 
the state must intervene to reduce the amplitude of the economic cycle to a socially 
acceptable and sustainable level. The American, British, Greek, and Icelandic cases do 
not represent the failure of neoliberal approaches, however, as they entailed deficit 
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spending both in times of growth and recession. Neither Keynesian nor neoliberal models 
advocate the type of moral hazard and unrestrained risk-taking exhibited by the four non-
Canadian case studies in this paper. However, financial and economic globalisation 
involves institutions which by their very scale and systemic importance are too big to fail, 
requiring government regulation and subsequently, as has been shown, coordination of 
such regulation at the international level. Basel III is an example of the attempt at global 
harmonization of liquidity risk management practices, and provides new metrics for 
regulators to monitor and stress-test financial institutions.
457
  
Financial globalisation and innovation have created forms of systemic risk which are 
structural rather than cyclical. Thus, neither a Keynesian nor neoclassical approach to the 
business cycle as such is in question regarding financial governance, although Canada 
certainly benefitted from following a more countercyclical macroeconomic platform. 
Rather it is the paradigmatic difference between interventionist versus laissez-fair 
oversight of the financial industry which is the key variable here. For decades the 
American government has subsidized housing as a democratically popular public good. 
However the lack of transparency in funding this provision – and extension to the private 
sector of similarly opaque funding privildeges – metastasized into system-wide 
underestimation of risk. This was transmitted worldwide through financial and economic 
globalization. The greater the degree of transparency and oversight in governance, the 
less opaque and imbalanced are institutional finances allowed to become. This holds true 
whether the institution in question is an investment bank, a government-sponsored 
enterprise, or a national government – hidden and unmanageable debt sooner or later 
results in a re-evaluation of default risk when it is revealed. The greater is the discrepancy 
between the institution’s accounting claims and reality, the sharper the correction and the 
greater the resulting dislocation.  
The size, systemic importance, interconnectedness, and sheer profligacy of financial 
institutions (and national governments) led to the recent financial and economic crisis 
occurring on a global scale. As authority for global governance, emergent in such bodies 
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as the Financial Stability Board, is at an as-yet nascent stage, the meantime will require 
close international coordination of financial and macro-prudential governance at the 
national level. It is absolutely critical that transparency and accountability allow the 
accurate appraisal of risk in global finance. The financial globalization arising from three 
decades of neoliberal barrier-removal has thus ironically renewed the role of the state in 
managing the most volatile sectors of the economy.
458
    
Left completely free of state intervention, markets might indeed conform to the rational 
choice models presented by efficient market theorists. However, the abstention of 
government from interfering when economic shocks generate massive social dislocations 
is politically infeasible. Moreover, markets do not exist independently as discrete 
systems, being preyed upon and interfered with by state interlocutors. Markets exist 
because of and within the legal frameworks established over time by states themselves. 
Indeed, it has been argued that rational-choice market expectations came to the fore after 
the 1980’s because of the stability engendered by decades of Keynesian economic 
management.
459
 Investment banking can increase profitability and better distribute risk, 
as can securitization. However just as unregulated investment banking resulted in the 
1929 crash and Great Depression, so too has unregulated securitization resulted in 
financial and economic crisis in this century.  
This paper has shown that regulation promoting risk transparency is crucial in avoiding 
the buildup of systemic risk which threatens financial stability, and by extension the 
economic and social systems which have come to depend upon it. Countercyclical 
policies in financial and economic governance are also crucial in mitigating the effects of 
market corrections should such risk develop. This applies both to the prevention of 
economic bubbles as well as the response to their collapse. The lesson is not that 
securitization is bad, but that it must be regulated at the national level, and coordinated by 
national agencies at the international level, if its benefits are not to be outweighed by the 
economic and social costs of unsustainable bubbles, booms and busts.  
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Glossary of Terms 
Asset-backed Security (ABS): A security whose value and payments are derived by a 
pool of underlying assets. These assets are typically illiquid and difficult to sell 
individually, so are collateralized into ABS to generate income. 
Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO): A type of asset-backed security which derives 
value and payments from underlying fixed-income assets, such as mortgages or bonds.  
Credit Default Swap (CDS): A contract or agreement whereby the protection buyer 
makes a series of payments to the seller, in exchange for a payoff in case of default of a 
credit instrument (such as a bond or loan). 
Financial  Governance: The act of governing finance at the national and international 
levels, relating to decisions that define expectations, grant power, and verify performance 
regarding the management, policies, guidance, and decision-rights of public and private 
stakeholders in the financial sector.  
Fiscal Policy: The use of government revenue collection (taxation and borrowing) 
expenditure to influence aggregate demand, resource allocation, and income distribution. 
Fiscal Stimulus: The process of increasing government spending and decreasing tax 
rates to increase aggregate demand. Keynesian theory prescribes fiscal stimulus during 
times of recession in order to achieve price stability, reduce unemployment, and 
encourage economic growth. 
Monetary Policy: the process of controlling the money supply, through open market 
operations and discount window lending, by the national monetary authority. Monetary 
policy typically aims to maintain stable interest and inflation rates, with the long-term 
goal of price stability. ‘Expansionary’ monetary policy refers to increasing the money 
supply with the aim of reducing the cost of borrowing and stimulating investment. 
‘Contractionary’ monetary policy refers to reducing the money supply, with the aim of 
increasing the cost of borrowing and curbing inflation. 
Monetary Stimulus: The process of increasing the money supply to reduce the cost of 
credit and stimulate investment and economic growth.  
Mortgage-backed security (MBS): An asset-backed security representing a claim on 
interest payments from securitized mortgage loans. 
Securities: Financial assets yielding interest or dividends, such as shares or bonds. 
Securitization: the pooling of contractual debt obligations to be sold to investors in 
exchange for regular interest payments deriving from the underlying debts’ repayment. 
Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV): A legal entity operating as a finance company 
for the purpose of issuing short-term securities at low interest rates and buying longer-
term securities at higher interest, in order to generate a profit to be passed on to investors. 
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